C
Chaki Ng
Researcher at Harvard University
Publications - 12
Citations - 596
Chaki Ng is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Resource allocation & Combinatorial auction. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 12 publications receiving 596 citations. Previous affiliations of Chaki Ng include Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Papers
More filters
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Mirage: a microeconomic resource allocation system for sensornet testbeds
Brent N. Chun,Philip Buonadonna,Alvin AuYoung,Chaki Ng,David C. Parkes,Jeffrey Shneidman,Alex C. Snoeren,Amin Vahdat +7 more
TL;DR: It is argued that a microeconomic resource allocation scheme, specifically the combinatorial auction, is well suited to testbed resource management and to demonstrate this, the Mirage resource allocation system is presented.
Proceedings Article
Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems
Jeffrey Shneidman,Chaki Ng,David C. Parkes,Alvin AuYoung,Alex C. Snoeren,Amin Vahdat,Brent N. Chun +6 more
TL;DR: It is believed that key challenges exist for a markets/systems integration that must be overcome for market-based computer resource allocation systems to succeed.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Provenance-Aware Sensor Data Storage
TL;DR: The key to sensor data identity is provenance, the full history or lineage of the data, which addresses the naming and indexing issues and is presented as a research agenda for constructing distributed, indexed repositories of sensor data.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Addressing strategic behavior in a deployed microeconomic resource allocator
TL;DR: This work presents the initial experience using Mirage, a microeconomic resource allocation system based on a repeated combinatorial auction, and proposes refinements to the system's current auction scheme to mitigate the strategies observed to date.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation
TL;DR: A simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction is provided, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting, and allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.