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Chaki Ng

Researcher at Harvard University

Publications -  12
Citations -  596

Chaki Ng is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Resource allocation & Combinatorial auction. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 12 publications receiving 596 citations. Previous affiliations of Chaki Ng include Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Proceedings ArticleDOI

Mirage: a microeconomic resource allocation system for sensornet testbeds

TL;DR: It is argued that a microeconomic resource allocation scheme, specifically the combinatorial auction, is well suited to testbed resource management and to demonstrate this, the Mirage resource allocation system is presented.
Proceedings Article

Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems

TL;DR: It is believed that key challenges exist for a markets/systems integration that must be overcome for market-based computer resource allocation systems to succeed.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Provenance-Aware Sensor Data Storage

TL;DR: The key to sensor data identity is provenance, the full history or lineage of the data, which addresses the naming and indexing issues and is presented as a research agenda for constructing distributed, indexed repositories of sensor data.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Addressing strategic behavior in a deployed microeconomic resource allocator

TL;DR: This work presents the initial experience using Mirage, a microeconomic resource allocation system based on a repeated combinatorial auction, and proposes refinements to the system's current auction scheme to mitigate the strategies observed to date.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation

TL;DR: A simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction is provided, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting, and allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.