C
Chaz Lever
Researcher at Georgia Institute of Technology
Publications - 6
Citations - 1733
Chaz Lever is an academic researcher from Georgia Institute of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: The Internet & Network security. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 6 publications receiving 1241 citations.
Papers
More filters
Proceedings Article
Understanding the mirai botnet
Manos Antonakakis,Tim April,Michael Bailey,Matthew Bernhard,Elie Bursztein,Jaime Cochran,Zakir Durumeric,J. Alex Halderman,Luca Invernizzi,Michalis Kallitsis,Deepak Kumar,Chaz Lever,Zane Ma,Joshua Mason,D. Menscher,Chad Seaman,Nick Sullivan,Kurt Thomas,Yi Zhou +18 more
TL;DR: It is argued that Mirai may represent a sea change in the evolutionary development of botnets--the simplicity through which devices were infected and its precipitous growth, and that novice malicious techniques can compromise enough low-end devices to threaten even some of the best-defended targets.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-Based IoT Deployments
TL;DR: This work systematize the literature for home-based IoT using this methodology in order to understand attack techniques, mitigations, and stakeholders, and evaluates
umDevices devices to augment the systematized literature inorder to identify neglected research areas.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
A Lustrum of Malware Network Communication: Evolution and Insights
TL;DR: It is seen that, for the vast majority of malware samples, network traffic provides the earliest indicator of infection—several weeks and often months before the malware sample is discovered and network defenders should rely on automated malware analysis to extract indicators of compromise and not to build early detection systems.
Book ChapterDOI
Enabling Network Security Through Active DNS Datasets
Athanasios Kountouras,Panagiotis Kintis,Chaz Lever,Yizheng Chen,Yacin Nadji,David Dagon,Manos Antonakakis,Rodney Joffe +7 more
TL;DR: In general, Internet miscreants make extensive use of short-lived disposable domains to promote a large variety of threats and support their criminal network operations.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Domain-Z: 28 Registrations Later Measuring the Exploitation of Residual Trust in Domains
TL;DR: This study sheds light on the seemingly unnoticed problem of residual domain trust by measuring the scope and growth of this abuse over the past six years and develops Alembic, a lightweight algorithm that uses only passive observations from the Domain Name System (DNS) to flag potential domain ownership changes.