Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

/pdf/sequencing-and-scheduling-algorithms-and-complexity-lnutyrr3kz.pdf

Sequencing and scheduling: algorithms and complexity

2005년 대한 생화학·분자생물학회 하계학술대회를 다녀와서

https://ira.lib.polyu.edu.hk/bitstream/10397/1269/1/SetupSurvey-2006%28June-19%29.pdf

A survey of scheduling problems with setup times or costs

Complexity and Approximation

The problem of sequencing jobs on a single machine to minimize total cost is considered. Machine capacity constraints require that, at any time, at most one job is processed. Also, no machine idle-time between processing jobs is allowed. In contrast to most research, it is not assumed that the cost is a non-decreasing function of completion time. A dynamic programming formulation of the problem is presented. Since the number of states required by this formulation is prohibitively large, the possibilities for branch and bound algorithms are explored. It is shown that the dynamic programming formulation can be relaxed by mapping the state-space onto a smaller state-space and performing the recursion on this smaller state-space, thereby giving a lower bound. Techniques for improving this lower bound through the use of penalties and through the use of state-space modifiers are discussed. Computational results are presented for the problem in which each job has a due date, and the objective is to minimize the sum of holding costs for jobs completed before their due date and tardiness costs for jobs completed after their due date.

Dynamic Programming State-Space Relaxation for Single-Machine Scheduling

An algorithm for single machine sequencing with release dates to minimize total weighted completion time

This paper considers a non-preemptive two-stage hybrid flow shop problem in which the first stage contains several identical machines, and the second stage contains a single machine Each job is to be processed on one of the first-stage machines, and then on the second-stage machine The objective is to find a schedule which minimizes the maximum completion time or makespan The problem is NP-hard in the strong sense, even when there are two machines at the first stage Several lower bounds are derived and are tested in a branch and bound algorithm Also, constructive heuristics are presented, and a descent algorithm is proposed Extensive computational tests with up to 250 jobs, and up to 10 machines in the first stage, indicate that some of the heuristics consistently generate optimal or near-optimal solutions

Scheduling a two-stage hybrid flow shop with parallel machines at the first stage

Airport runway optimization is an ongoing challenge for air traffic controllers. Since demand for air-transportation is predicted to increase, there is a need to realize additional take-off and landing slots through better runway scheduling. In this paper, we review the techniques and tools of operational research and management science that are used for scheduling aircraft landings and take-offs. The main solution techniques include dynamic programming, branch and bound, heuristics and meta-heuristics.

Chris N. Potts

Papers

Dynamic Programming State-Space Relaxation for Single-Machine Scheduling

An algorithm for single machine sequencing with release dates to minimize total weighted completion time

Scheduling a two-stage hybrid flow shop with parallel machines at the first stage

Airport runway scheduling

Parallel machine scheduling with a common server