Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

/pdf/sequencing-and-scheduling-algorithms-and-complexity-lnutyrr3kz.pdf

Sequencing and scheduling: algorithms and complexity

2005년 대한 생화학·분자생물학회 하계학술대회를 다녀와서

https://ira.lib.polyu.edu.hk/bitstream/10397/1269/1/SetupSurvey-2006%28June-19%29.pdf

A survey of scheduling problems with setup times or costs

Complexity and Approximation

This paper develops a branch and bound algorithm for solving the single‐machine schedulingproblem with the objective of minimizing the maximum tardiness of any job, subjectto the constraint that the total number of tardy jobs is minimum. The algorithm uses a newlower bounding scheme, which is based on due date relaxation. Various dominance rules areused in the algorithm to limit the size of the search tree. Results of extensive computationaltests show that the proposed branch and bound algorithm is effective in solving problemswith up to 1000 jobs.

Single‐machine scheduling to minimize maximumtardiness with minimum number of tardy jobs

In the bounded knapsack problem with setups there are a limited number of copies of each item and the inclusion of an item in the knapsack requires a fixed setup capacity. Analysis of special cases of the problem allows us to derive the borderline between hard and easy problems. We develop a branch and bound algorithm for the general problem and present some computational results.

/pdf/the-bounded-knapsack-problem-with-setups-4lkvdcaxt3.pdf

The Bounded Knapsack Problem with Setups

A review of airport runway optimization

Bicriteria efficiency/equity hierarchical location models for application in healthcare and other sectors

We consider a production planning problem with two planning periods. Detailed planning occurs in the first period, when complete information is known about a set of orders that are initially available. An additional set of orders becomes available at the start of the second planning period. The objective is to maximize the number of on-time orders. We derive an upper bound on the competitive ratio of any deterministic online algorithm, relative to the performance of an algorithm with perfect information about the second set of orders. This ratio depends on the relative lengths of the two planning periods. We also describe an efficient algorithm that delivers a solution which asymptotically achieves this upper bound ratio as the number of jobs becomes large.

/pdf/online-production-planning-to-maximize-the-number-of-on-time-156m8f4hnx.pdf

Chris N. Potts

Papers

Single‐machine scheduling to minimize maximumtardiness with minimum number of tardy jobs

The Bounded Knapsack Problem with Setups

A review of airport runway optimization

Bicriteria efficiency/equity hierarchical location models for application in healthcare and other sectors

Online production planning to maximize the number of on-time orders