C
Christoph Hauert
Researcher at University of British Columbia
Publications - 102
Citations - 16951
Christoph Hauert is an academic researcher from University of British Columbia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Population & Evolutionary dynamics. The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 99 publications receiving 15357 citations. Previous affiliations of Christoph Hauert include University of Vienna & Harvard University.
Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
TL;DR: A surprisingly simple rule is described that is a good approximation for all graphs that are analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k.
Journal ArticleDOI
Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
Christoph Hauert,Michael Doebeli +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that spatial structure reduces the proportion of cooperators for a wide range of parameters in unstructured snowdrift games, and in particular, spatial structure eliminates cooperation if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is high.
Journal ArticleDOI
Evolutionary dynamics on graphs
TL;DR: This work determines the fixation probability of mutants, and characterize those graphs for which fixation behaviour is identical to that of a homogeneous population, and shows that the outcome of evolutionary games can depend entirely on the structure of the underlying graph.
Journal ArticleDOI
Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games
Christoph Hauert,Christoph Hauert,Silvia De Monte,Silvia De Monte,Josef Hofbauer,Karl Sigmund,Karl Sigmund +6 more
TL;DR: This work presents a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity that shows that in voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist and shows that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms.
Journal ArticleDOI
Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
TL;DR: A surprisingly simple model shows that if individuals have the option to stand aside and abstain from the joint endeavor, this paves the way for the emergence and establishment of cooperative behavior based on the punishment of defectors.