We hypothesize that there is a general bias, based on both innate predispositions and experience, in animals and humans, to give greater weight to negative entities (e.g., events, objects, personal traits). This is manifested in 4 ways: (a) negative potency (negative entities are stronger than the equivalent positive entities), (b) steeper nega tive gradients (the negativity of negative events grows more rapidly with approach to them in space or time than does the positivity of positive events, (c) negativity domi nance (combinations of negative and positive entities yield evaluations that are more negative than the algebraic sum of individual subjective valences would predict), and (d) negative differentiation (negative entities are more varied, yield more complex conceptual representations, and engage a wider response repertoire). We review evi dence for this taxonomy, with emphasis on negativity dominance, including literary, historical, religious, and cultural sources, as well as the psychological literatures on learning, attention, impression formation, contagion, moral judgment, development, and memory. We then consider a variety of theoretical accounts for negativity bias. We suggest that 1 feature of negative events that make them dominant is that negative entities are more contagious than positive entities.

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Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion

Traditional approaches to organizational change have been dominated by assumptions privileging stability, routine, and order. As a result, organizational change has been reified and treated as exceptional rather than natural. In this paper, we set out to offer an account of organizational change on its own terms--to treat change as the normal condition of organizational life. The central question we address is as follows: What must organization(s) be like if change is constitutive of reality? Wishing to highlight the pervasiveness of change in organizations, we talk about organizational becoming. Change, we argue, is the reweaving of actors' webs of beliefs and habits of action to accommodate new experiences obtained through interactions. Insofar as this is an ongoing process, that is to the extent actors try to make sense of and act coherently in the world, change is inherent in human action, and organizations are sites of continuously evolving human action. In this view, organization is a secondary accomplishment, in a double sense. Firstly, organization is the attempt to order the intrinsic flux of human action, to channel it towards certain ends by generalizing and institutionalizing particular cognitive representations. Secondly, organization is a pattern that is constituted, shaped, and emerging from change. Organization aims at stemming change but, in the process of doing so, it is generated by it. These claims are illustrated by drawing on the work of several organizational ethnographers. The implications of this view for theory and practice are outlined.

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On Organizational Becoming: Rethinking Organizational Change

The Promise of Happiness is a provocative cultural critique of the imperative to be happy. It asks what follows when we make our desires and even our own happiness conditional on the happiness of others: “I just want you to be happy”; “I’m happy if you’re happy.” Combining philosophy and feminist cultural studies, Sara Ahmed reveals the affective and moral work performed by the “happiness duty,” the expectation that we will be made happy by taking part in that which is deemed good, and that by being happy ourselves, we will make others happy. Ahmed maintains that happiness is a promise that directs us toward certain life choices and away from others. Happiness is promised to those willing to live their lives in the right way.

Ahmed draws on the intellectual history of happiness, from classical accounts of ethics as the good life, through seventeenth-century writings on affect and the passions, eighteenth-century debates on virtue and education, and nineteenth-century utilitarianism. She engages with feminist, antiracist, and queer critics who have shown how happiness is used to justify social oppression, and how challenging oppression causes unhappiness. Reading novels and films including Mrs. Dalloway, The Well of Loneliness, Bend It Like Beckham, and Children of Men, Ahmed considers the plight of the figures who challenge and are challenged by the attribution of happiness to particular objects or social ideals: the feminist killjoy, the unhappy queer, the angry black woman, and the melancholic migrant. Through her readings she raises critical questions about the moral order imposed by the injunction to be happy.

The Promise of Happiness

The organizational problem firms face is the utilization of knowledge which is not, and cannot be, known by a single agent. Even more importantly, no single agent can fully specify in advance what kind of practical knowledge is going to be relevant, when and where. Firms, therefore, are distributed knowledge systems in a strong sense: they are decentered systems, iacking an overseeing 'mind'. The knowledge they need to draw upon is inherently indeterminate and continually emerging; it is not self-contained. Individuals' stock of knowledge consists of (a) role-related normative expectations; (b) dispositions, which have been formed in the course of past socializations; and (c) local knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place. A firm has greater-or-lesser control over normative expectations, but very limited control over the other two. At any point in time, a firm's knowledge is the indeterminate outcome of individuals attempting to manage the inevitable tensions between normative expectations, dispositions, and local contexts.

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The firm as a distributed knowledge system : A constructionist approach

Self-enhancement denotes a class of psychological phenomena that involve taking a tendentiously positive view of oneself. We distinguish between four levels of self-enhancement—an observed effect, an ongoing process, a personality trait, and an underlying motive—and then use these distinctions to organize the wealth of relevant research. Furthermore, to render these distinctions intuitive, we draw an extended analogy between self-enhancement and the phenomenon of eating. Among the topics we address are (a) manifestations of self-enhancement, both obvious and subtle, and rival interpretations; (b) experimentally documented dynamics of affirming and threatening the ego; and (c) primacy of self-enhancement, considered alongside other intrapsychic phenomena, and across different cultures. Self-enhancement, like eating, is a fundamental part of human nature.

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Self-Enhancement: Food for Thought.

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The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1

Christopher Janaway presents a full commentary on Nietzsche's most studied work, On the Genealogy of Morality , and combines close reading of key passages with an overview of Nietzsche's wider aims. Arguing that Nietzsche's goal is to pursue psychological and historical truths concerning the origins of modern moral values, Beyond Selflessness is distinctive in that it also emphasizes the significance of Nietzsches rhetorical methods as an instrument of persuasion. Nietzsche's outlook is broadly naturalist, but he is critical of typical scientific and philosophical methods for their advocacy of impersonality and suppression of the affects. In contrast to his opponents, Schopenhauer and Paul Ree, who both account for morality in terms of selflessness, Nietzsche believes that our allegiance to a post-Christian morality that centres around selflessness, compassion, guilt, and denial of the instincts is not primarily rational but affective: underlying feelings, often ambivalent and poorly grasped in conscious thought, explain our moral beliefs. The Genealogy is designed to detach the reader from his or her allegiance to morality and prepare for the possibility of new values. Janaway shows how, according to Nietzsches perspectivism, one can best understand a topic such as morality through allowing as many of ones feelings as possible to speak about it, and how Nietzsche seeks to enable us to feel differently': his provocation of the reader's affects helps us grasp the affective origins of our attitudes and prepare the way for healthier values such as the affirmation of life (as tested by the thought of eternal return) and the self-satisfaction to be attained by 'giving style to one's character'. Contents A Note on Translations and Abbreviations 1. Nietzsche's aims and targets 2. Reading Nietzsche's Preface 3. Naturalism and genealogy 4. Selflessness: the struggle with Schopenhauer 5. Nietzsche and Paul Ree on the origin of moral feelings 6. Good and evil: Nietzsche's artistic revaluation 7. Free will, autonomy, and the sovereign individual 8. Guilt, bad conscience, and self-punishment 9. Will to power in the Genealogy 10. Nietzsche's illustration of the art of exegesis 11. Disinterestedness and objectivity 12. Perspectival knowing and the affects 13. The ascetic ideal, meaning, and truth 14. Beyond selflessness

Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy

Art of Judgement

Introduction Christopher Janaway 1. Schopenhauer on the self Gunter Zoller 2. Schopenhauer and knowledge David Hamlyn 3. The fourfold root Frank C. White 4. Schopenhauer, Kant, and the methods of philosophy Paul Guyer 5. Will and nature Christopher Janaway 6. The influences of Eastern thought on Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Thing in Itself Moira Nicholls 7. Ideas and imagination: Schopenhauer on the proper foundation of art Cheryl Foster 8. Schopenhauer's narrower sense of morality David E. Cartwright 9. Schopenhauer on death Dale Jacquette 10. Schopenhauer's pessimism Christopher Janaway 11. Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Dionysus Martha C. Nussbaum 12. Schopenhauer, will, and the unconscious Sebastian Gardner 13. Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein: representation as language and will Hans-Johann Glock.

The Cambridge companion to Schopenhauer

Plato was the first great figure in Western philosophy to assess the value of the arts; he famously argued in the Republic that traditionally accepted forms of poetry, drama, and music are unsound, claiming they are conducive to warped ethical standards, detrimental to the psyche, and purveyors of illusions about important matters in human life. This view has been widely rejected; but Christopher Janaway here argues that Plato's hostile case is a more coherent and a more profound challenge to the arts than has sometimes been supposed.

Christopher Janaway

Papers

The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1

Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy

Art of Judgement

The Cambridge companion to Schopenhauer

Images of excellence: Plato's critique of the arts