Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 1995"
1,865 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Cognitive Science Changes Ethics: The Moral Law Folk Theory, Metaphoric Morality, and Beyond Rules, the Impoverishment of Reason: Our Enlightenment Legacy 6: What's Wrong with the Objectivist Self 7: Narrative Context of Self and Action 8: Moral Imagination 9: Living without Absolutes: Objectivity and the Conditions for Criticism 10: Preserving Our Best Enlightenment Moral Ideals Notes Index
Abstract: Preface Acknowledgments Introduction: How Cognitive Science Changes Ethics 1: Reason as Force: The Moral Law Folk Theory 2: Metaphoric Morality 3: The Metaphoric Basis of Moral Theory 4: Beyond Rules 5: The Impoverishment of Reason: Our Enlightenment Legacy 6: What's Wrong with the Objectivist Self 7: The Narrative Context of Self and Action 8: Moral Imagination 9: Living without Absolutes: Objectivity and the Conditions for Criticism 10: Preserving Our Best Enlightenment Moral Ideals Notes Index
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TL;DR: In this article, a kind of history of my life (1734) is described, along with the autobiographies of my own life and My Own Life (1776), as well as the structure of Hume's political theory.
Abstract: 1. An introduction to Hume's thought David Fate Norton 2. Hume's new science of the mind John Biro 3. Hume and the philosophy of science Alexander Rosenberg 4. Hume's scepticism Robert J. Fogelin 5. Hume's moral psychology Terence Penelhum 6. Hume, human nature, and the foundations of morality David Fate Norton 7. The structure of Hume's political theory Knud Haakonssen 8. David Hume: principles of political economy Andrew S. Skinner 9. Hume's literary and aesthetic theory Peter Jones 10. David Hume, 'the historian' David Wootton 11. Hume on religion John Gaskin Appendix: Hume's autobiographies I. A Kind of History of my Life (1734) II. My Own Life (1776).
142 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a functionalist account of the cognitive content of evaluative belief, and then show why assent to such a content should generally be expected to involve the presence of a corresponding desire.
Abstract: Cognitivists are on solid ground, it seems to us, when they maintain that practical evaluations - 'this is right', 'that is fair' - are expressions of judgement and belief (even if these may be massively mistaken). Their non-cognitivist opponents deny the appearances when they say that such evaluations are expressive only of feeling or desire or some such noncognitive attitude that differs from belief and its cognates in not being subject, in its own right, to the same disciplines of evidence and logic and reasoning. But while cognitivists are on the side of common sense in this respect, they have had a hard time meeting two challenges (see Blackburn 1984, 1993; Gibbard). The first challenge is to say what the cognitive content of evaluative belief is, given that the content is supposed to give direct if defeasible support to a conclusion about what should be desired and done. The second challenge is to explain why assent to such a content is not just inductively associated with forming a corresponding desire to act as the evaluation prescribes, why it is a matter of surprise, to be explained by some malaise like weakness of will, if someone sincerely assents to the positive evaluation of an option without feeling any inclination towards it (Smith 1989). The first challenge comes of the Humean assumption that matters of cognition, matters of putative fact, do not imply prescriptions: there is a gap between 'is' and 'ought'. The second comes of the assumption, equally Humean in origin, that states of cognition are motivationally inert and only lead to behaviour under the impulse of a distinct state of desire: reason, as it is said, is the slave of the passions. This paper is an attempt to sketch an answer to these two challenges. It presents what we describe as a functionalist account of the cognitive content of evaluative belief, and then shows why assent to such a content should generally be expected to involve the presence of a corresponding desire. We stress that the paper is only a sketch of our answer to the two challenges, for the matters we discuss connect with almost every issue in meta-ethics and it is not possible to do full justice to them here. We offer. the sketch in the hope that the position we identify, once it has
116 citations
TL;DR: The authors discuss the difference entre la justification des croyances and the verite dans le pragmatisme de D. Davidson and l'anti-pragmatism of C. Wright.
Abstract: L'A. etudie le probleme de la difference entre la justification des croyances et la verite dans le pragmatisme de D. Davidson et l'anti-pragmatisme de C. Wright. L'A. montre que les deux philosophes ne defendent pas la meme forme de minimalisme concernant la verite, mais qu'ils s'accordent pour rejeter le deflationnisme
93 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: This paper argued that Plato's hostile case is a coherent and a more profound challenge to the arts than has sometimes been supposed, arguing that traditionally accepted forms of poetry, drama, and music are unsound, claiming they are conducive to warped ethical standards, detrimental to the psyche, and purveyors of illusions about important matters in human life.
Abstract: Plato was the first great figure in Western philosophy to assess the value of the arts; he famously argued in the Republic that traditionally accepted forms of poetry, drama, and music are unsound, claiming they are conducive to warped ethical standards, detrimental to the psyche, and purveyors of illusions about important matters in human life. This view has been widely rejected; but Christopher Janaway here argues that Plato's hostile case is a more coherent and a more profound challenge to the arts than has sometimes been supposed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors remet en question les experimentations sur animaux dans la recherche scientifique, and propose a theory de l'evolution to explain them.
Abstract: L'A. remet en question les experimentations sur animaux dans la recherche scientifique. A l'appui des theories de l'evolution, il montre que ces experiences peuvent etre utilisees dans certains domaines mais qu'elles peuvent aussi manquer totalement de fiabilite dans la recherche plus poussee
TL;DR: In this article, two suspect theories real and other effects the mind-brain connection causation? origination? our actions neuroscience and quantum theory shots in the foot? dismay, intransigence compatibilism and incompatibilists affirmation punishment and more.
Abstract: Introduction to two suspect theories real and other effects the mind-brain connection causation? origination? our actions neuroscience and quantum theory shots in the foot? dismay, intransigence compatibilism and incompatibilism affirmation punishment and more.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend l'indistinctabilite phenomenale de l'illusion and de la perception vraie, and argue that l'argument of illusion is concluant in the domain of theorie morale and epistemologie.
Abstract: L'A defend la these selon laquelle l'indistinctabilite phenomenale de l'illusion et de la perception vraie en ce qui concerne l'apparence de l'objet percu peut s'expliquer sans admettre l'intervention d'un element externaliste dans le second cas L'A montre que l'argument de l'illusion est concluant dans le domaine de la theorie morale (philosophie de l'action) ainsi qu'en epistemologie (theorie de la justification, externalisme/internalisme)
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an introduction and guide through philosophy, which is intended to accompany a complete university course in philosphy, orientating, assisting, and stimulating the student at every stage.
Abstract: This is an introduction and guide through philosophy. It is intended to accompany a complete university course in philosphy, orientating, assisting, and stimulating the student at every stage. It comprises eleven extended essays, specially commissioned from leading philosophers. Each essay surveys a major area of the subject and offers an accessible but sophisticated account of the main debates. An extended introduction maps out the philosophical terrain and explains how the different subjects relate to each other. The first part of the book deals with the foundations of philosophical enquiry: epistemology; philosophical logic; methodology; metaphysics; and the philosophy of mind . The second part offers four historical chapters, two on ancient and two on modern philosophy, introducing great thinkers from the past, explaining and discussing their ideas, and showing the value of studying them today. The third part comprises two chapters devoted to questions of value, in ethics and aesthetics. Full annotated bibliographies are provided at the ends of chapters to serve as guides to further reading. This is real philosophy, not simplified philosophy: it will be accessible for the beginner but equally valuable for the third year student. Difficult and challenging questions are not shirked; the reader will be given a sense of involvement in the practise of philosophy today. This book is intended for all undergraduate students of philosophy (first-year to third-year) and their teachers. Also general readers and readers from other academic disciplines.
TL;DR: The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy as mentioned in this paper has been a hot topic in the last few decades and has been studied extensively in the literature. But it has not yet been studied in the general public.
Abstract: Overview Part I. The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy: 1. Psychological foundationalism 2. Axiological foundationalism 3. Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasibility 4. The foundationalism-coherentism controversy: hardened stereotypes and overlapping theories Part II. Knowledge and Justification: 5. the limits of self-knowledge 6. defeated knowledge, reliability, and justification 7. The causal structure of indirect justification 8. Belief, reason, and inference 9. Structural justification Part III. Epistemic Principles and Skepticism: 10. Justification, truth and reliability 11. Causalist internalism 12. The old skepticism, the new foundationalism, and naturalized epistemology Part IV. Rationality: 13. An epistemic conception of rationality 14. Rationalization and rationality 15. The architecture of reason.
TL;DR: In this article, the A.A. etudie le probleme de la regression a l'infini en ce qui concerne les references du langage tel qu'il a ete pose par Bradley, and montre que le problem se joue au niveau de la copule dans les relations predicatives
Abstract: L'A. etudie le probleme de la regression a l'infini en ce qui concerne les references du langage tel qu'il a ete pose par Bradley. S'appuyant sur diverses theories de philosophie du langage, l'A. montre que le probleme se joue au niveau de la copule dans les relations predicatives
TL;DR: The denial of closure is one of the least plausible ideas to come down the philosophical pike in recent years as discussed by the authors, and it has been criticised by many other philosophers, such as Vogel.
Abstract: Closure principles for epistemic justification hold that one is justified in believing the logical consequences, perhaps of a specified sort, of things one justifiably believes. Unrestricted closure principles do not limit the principle to consequences having any particular property. Restricted closure principles say that only certain sorts of consequences of justified beliefs, e.g., 'obvious consequences', must be justified. The denial of closure is supposed to be helpful in responding to sceptics.) Sceptics argue that the things we ordinarily take ourselves to know, e.g., that I see a table in front of me, imply anti-sceptical hypotheses, e.g., that I am not being deceived by an evil demon into falsely thinking that I see a table. Sceptics contend that we do not know these anti-sceptical propositions. That claim, combined with closure, implies that we do not know the propositions we ordinarily think we know. Denying closure evades this sceptical argument. Robert Audi, among others, has proposed examples designed to show that the denial of the closure principle is plausible.2 I believe that some version of the closure principle, restricted to known consequences, is surely true. Indeed, the idea that no version of this principle is true strikes me, and many other philosophers, as one of the least plausible ideas to come down the philosophical pike in recent years. I believe that much of the case against the principles has been refuted by Jonathan Vogel,3 Audi has recently offered a new objection to closure principles. In this paper I shall take up his objection. There are details about exactly how to formulate the closure principle that warrant attention. It is clearly not true that if you are justified in believing a proposition then you are justified in believing all its logical consequences. Those logical consequences will always include complex and distant consequences you do not even understand. Such consequences are not justified for you. So an unrestricted closure principle is false. A more plausible closure principle, restricted to known consequences, is
TL;DR: The authors rejette the notion of quasi-memoire and defend a forme d'idealisme transcendantal contre le naturalisme, which is a form of idealism that is anti-realism.
Abstract: L'A. developpe une approche anti-realiste de l'identite personnelle qui ne cherche pas a briser la circularite du critere de la memoire, mais au contraire l'accepte comme le reflet de l'unite de la conscience. L'A. rejette la notion de quasi-memoire et defend une forme d'idealisme transcendantal contre le naturalisme
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TL;DR: In this article, the A.A. vise a montrer la sterilite des theories de la connaissance qui opposent raison and intuition, and montre l'importance de l'intuition dans le raisonnement reel (et non dans the raison nement purement technique).
Abstract: L'A. vise a montrer la sterilite des theories de la connaissance qui opposent raison et intuition. S'appuyant sur la conception de Kuhn, il montre l'importance de l'intuition dans le raisonnement reel (et non dans le raisonnement purement technique)
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the theorie politique et sociale de Waldron en comparaison avec celle de Rawls sur la question du droit a un minimum social for les citoyens.
Abstract: L'A. etudie la theorie politique et sociale de Waldron en comparaison avec celle de Rawls sur la question du droit a un minimum social pour les citoyens. Il examine comment Waldron rejette les conceptions a base egalitariste de la legitimite et plaide pour une transparence des institutions sociales, ce qui lui parait etre l'engagement principal du liberalisme