W. Wilson's (1967) review of the area of subjective well-being (SWB) advanced several conclusions regarding those who report high levels of "happiness". A number of his conclusions have been overturned: youth and modest aspirations no longer are seen as prerequisites of SWB. E. Diener's (1984) review placed greater emphasis on theories that stressed psychological factors. In the current article, the authors review current evidence for Wilson's conclusions and discuss modern theories of SWB that stress dispositional influences, adaptation, goals, and coping strategies. The next steps in the evolution of the field are to comprehend the interaction of psychological factors with life circumstances in producing SWB, to understand the causal pathways leading to happiness, understand the processes underlying adaptation to events, and develop theories that explain why certain variables differentially influence the different components of SWV (life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect).

Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress

The emerging field of emotion regulation studies how individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them. This review takes an evolutionary perspective and characterizes emotion in terms of response tendencies. Emotion regulation is denned and distinguished from coping, mood regulation, defense, and affect regulation. In the increasingly specialized discipline of psychology, the field of emotion regulation cuts across traditional boundaries and provides common ground. According to a process model of emotion regulation, emotion may be regulated at five points in the emotion generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cognitions, and (e) modulation of responses. The field of emotion regulation promises new insights into age-old questions about how people manage their emotions.

http://www.elaborer.org/cours/A13/lectures/Gross1998.pdf

The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

https://www.motherjones.com/files/emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

This paper discusses the discounted utility (DU) model: its historical development, underlying assumptions, and "anomalies" - the empirical regularities that are inconsistent with its theoretical predictions. We then summarize the alternate theoretical formulations that have been advanced to address these anomalies. We also review three decades of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and discuss reasons for the spectacular variation in implicit discount rates across studies. Throughout the paper, we stress the importance of distinguishing time preference, per se, from many other considerations that also influence intertemporal choices.

/pdf/time-discounting-and-time-preference-a-critical-review-47don96ek5.pdf

Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review

the total number of papers may exceed 10,000. Nevertheless, cost consideration forced us to consider mostly published papers and technical reports in English. 4 Formula 4 in Seifert (1991) is in error—a multiplier of n, of cell size, is missing in the numerator. 5 Unfortunately, the technique of meta-analysis cannot be applied, at present time, to such effects because the distribution of dis based on a sampling of people, whereas the statistics of techniques such as ARIMA are based on the distribution of a sampling of observations in the time domain regardless of the size of the people sample involved (i.e., there is no way to compare a sample of 100 points in time with a sample of 100 people). That is, a sample of 100 points in time has the same degrees of freedom if it were based on an observation of 1 person or of 1,000 people. 258 KLUGER AND DENISI From the papers we reviewed, only 131 (5%) met the criteria for inclusion. We were concerned that, given the small percentage of usable papers, our conclusions might not fairly represent the larger body of relevant literature. Therefore, we analyzed all the major reasons to reject a paper from the meta-analysis, even though the decision to exclude a paper came at the first identification of a missing inclusion criterion. This analysis showed the presence of review articles, interventions of natural feedback removal, and papers that merely discuss feedback, which in turn suggests that the included studies represent 1015% of the empirical FI literature. However, this analysis also showed that approximately 37% of the papers we considered manipulated feedback without a control group and that 16% reported confounded treatments, that is, roughly two thirds of the empirical FI literature cannot shed light on the question of FI effects on performance—a fact that requires attention from future FI researchers. Of the usable 131 papers (see references with asterisks), 607 effect sizes were extracted. These effects were based on 12,652 participants and 23,663 observations (reflecting multiple observations per participant). The average sample size per effect was 39 participants. The distribution of the effect sizes is presented in Figure 1. The weighted mean (weighted by sample size) of this distribution is 0.41, suggesting that, on average, FI has a moderate positive effect on performance. However, over 38% of the effects were negative (see Figure 1). The weighted variance of this distribution is 0.97, whereas the estimate of the sampling error variance is only 0.09. A potential problem in meta-analyses is a violation of the assumption of independence. Such a violation occurs either when multiple observations are taken from the same study (Rosenthal, 1984) or when several papers are authored by the same person (Wolf, 1986). In the present investigation, there were 91 effects derived from the laboratory experiments reported by Mikulincer (e.g., 1988a, 1988b). This raises the possibility that the average effect size is biased, because his studies manipulated extreme negative FIs and used similar tasks. In fact, the weighted average d in Mikulincer's studies was —0.39; whereas in the remainder of the

The effects of feedback interventions on performance: A historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory.

This research identifies a new source of failure to make accurate affective predictions or to make experientially optimal choices. When people make predictions or choices, they are often in the joint evaluation (JE) mode; when people actually experience an event, they are often in the single evaluation (SE) mode. The “utility function” of an attribute can vary systematically between SE and JE. When people in JE make predictions or choices for events to be experienced in SE, they often resort to their JE preferences rather than their SE preferences and overpredict the difference that different values of an attribute (e.g., different salaries) will make to their happiness in SE. This overprediction is referred to as the distinction bias. The present research also specifies when the distinction bias occurs and when it does not. This research contributes to literatures on experienced utility, affective forecasting, and happiness. Suppose that a person is faced with two job offers. She finds one job interesting and the other tedious. However, the interesting job will pay her only $60,000 a year, and the tedious job will pay her $70,000 a year. The person wants to choose the job that will give her the greatest overall happiness. To make that choice, she tries to predict the difference in happiness between earning $60,000 a year and earning $70,000 a year and also predict the difference in happiness between doing the interesting job and doing the tedious job. Is she able to make these predictions accurately? Is she able to choose the job that will indeed bring her the greater overall happiness?

Distinction bias: Misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation

Although both cognitive and motivational factors can influence the communication of uncertain information, most of the work investigating the communication of uncertainty has focused on cognitive factors. In this article, we demonstrate that motivational factors influence the communication of private, uncertain information and we describe the relationship between elasticity (i.e. uncertainty and vagueness) and motivated communication. We report results from four experiments that demonstrate that motivated communication is not purely opportunistic. The values people report are constrained by the elasticity of private information even when the costs and benefits of misrepresenting information are held constant. Perceptions of justifiability mediate the relationship between elasticity and motivated communication, and we explain our results in terms of the self-justification process.

Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information

We use insurance behavior as a context to study affective influences in seemingly purely monetary decisions. We report two related findings. First, people are more willing to purchase insurance for an object at stake, the more affection they have for the object, holding the amount of compensation constant.Second, if the object is damaged, people are also more willing to go through the trouble of claiming a fixed amount of compensation, the more affection they have for the object. These effects are not predicted by standard decision theories. We explain these findings by a consolation hypothesis, according to which, people perceive insurance compensation as a token of consolation, and we discuss its implications for affective influences in other types of decisions.

The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions

We use insurance behavior as a context to study affective influences in seemingly purely monetary decisions. We report two related findings. First, people are more willing to purchase insurance for an object at stake, the more affection they have for the object, holding the amount of compensation constant. Second, if the object is damaged, people are also more willing to go through the trouble of claiming a fixed amount of compensation, the more affection they have for the object. These effects are not predicted by standard decision theories. We explain these findings by a “consolation hypothesis,” according to which, people perceive insurance compensation as a token of consolation, and we discuss its implications for affective influences in other types of decisions.

This research investigated the relationship between the magnitude or scope of a stimulus and its subjective value by contrasting 2 psychological processes that may be used to construct preferences: valuation by feeling and valuation by calculation. The results show that when people rely on feeling, they are sensitive to the presence or absence of a stimulus (i.e., the difference between 0 and some scope) but are largely insensitive to further variations of scope. In contrast, when people rely on calculation, they reveal relatively more constant sensitivity to scope. Thus, value is nearly a step function of scope when feeling predominates and is closer to a linear function when calculation predominates. These findings may allow for a novel interpretation of why most real-world value functions are concave and how the processes responsible for nonlinearity of value may also contribute to nonlinear probability weighting.

Christopher K. Hsee

Papers

Distinction bias: Misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation

Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information

The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions

The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions

The Construction of Preference: Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the Affective Psychology of Value