The gravity model has been widely used to infer substantial trade flow effects of institutions such as customs unions and exchange rate mechanisms. McCallum [1995] found that the US-Canada border led to trade between provinces that is a factor 22 (2,200%) times trade between states and provinces, a spectacular puzzle in light of the low formal barriers on this border. We show that the gravity model usually estimated does not correspond to the theory behind it. We solve the 'border puzzle' by applying the theory seriously. We find that national borders reduce trade between the US and Canada by about 44%, while reducing trade among other industrialized countries by about 30%. McCallum's spectacular headline number is the result of a combination of omitted variables bias and the small size of the Canadian economy. Within-Canada trade rises by a factor 6 due to the border. In contrast, within-US trade rises 25%.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=256086

Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle

2 1 The innovative transport systems and the CityMobil project 10 1.1 The research questions 10 2 The state of art in the field of automatic transport systems 12 2.1 Case studies and demand studies for innovative transport systems 12 3 The design and implementation of surveys 14 3.1 Definition of experimental design 14 3.2 Questionnaire design and delivery 16 3.3 First analyses on the collected sample 18 4 Calibration of Logit Multionomial demand models 21 4.1 Methodology 21 4.2 Calibration of the “full” model. 22 4.3 Calibration of the “final” model 24 4.4 The demand analysis through the final Multinomial Logit model 25 5 The analysis of interaction between the demand and socioeconomic attributes 31 5.1 Methodology 31 5.2 Application of Mixed Logit models to the demand 31 5.3 Analysis of the interactions between demand and socioeconomic attributes through Mixed Logit models 32 5.4 Mixed Logit model and interaction between age and the demand for the CTS 38 5.5 Demand analysis with Mixed Logit model 39 6 Final analyses and conclusions 45 6.1 Comparison between the results of the analyses 45 6.2 Conclusions 48 6.3 Answers to the research questions and future developments 52

The European commission

Treatments of risk in the international management literature largely focus on particular uncertainties to the exclusion of other interrelated uncertainties. This paper develops a framework for categorizing the uncertainties faced by firms operating internationally and outlines both financial and strategic corporate risk management responses.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fpalgrave.jibs.8490270.pdf

A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business

The formal and informal structures of firms and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation. This paper explores the properties of different types of firms with respect to the generation of new technology. Various archetypes are recognized and an effort is made to match organization structure to the type of innovation. The framework is relevant to technology and competition policy as it broadens the framework economists use to identify environments that assist innovation.

Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Technological Innovation

Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological innovation☆

The common approach in empirical capital structure research has been to study the determinants of optimal leverage by studying the association between observed leverage and a set of explanatory variables. This approach has two major shortcomings. First, the observed leverage need not necessarily be the optimal leverage. Second, the empirical analyses, being effectively non-dynamic, are unable to shed any light on the nature of dynamic capital structure adjustment by firms. In this paper, we use a dynamic adjustment model, and panel data methodology on a sample of UK and US firms to specifically establish the determinants of a time-varying optimal capital structure. In addition, the model allows for the possibility that at any point in time firms' observed leverage may not be optimal, and that firms differ in their speed of adjustment towards the optimal capital structure, which itself may be changing over time for the same firm. We also attempt to identify factors determining the speed of adjustment. We find that firms typically have capital structures that are not at the target, and that they adjust very slowly towards the target.

The Dynamics of Capital Structure

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary effect of partial deposit insurance systems in a cross-section analysis of industrial and emerging market economies, as well as in emerging markets alone. The coverage that maximizes market discipline depends on country-specific characteristics of bank governance. This "risk-minimizing" deposit insurance coverage is compared to the actual coverage in a group of countries in emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets

http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=business_articles

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization contributes to the likelihood of a financial crisis. We focus on banking crises and argue that they are most likely to occur after some degree, but not full, liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms in 48 countries between 1973 and 2005, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of crisis. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking crises depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. With very weak regulation and supervision the probability of banking crises is increasing with liberalization but this relationship is reversed as regulation and supervision become stricter. The most important type of liberalization in relation to banking crises seems to be behavioral (a relaxation of interest and credit controls). A policy implication is that positive growth-effects of liberalization can be achieved without increasing the risk of a banking crisis if appropriate institutions are developed.

/pdf/financial-liberalization-and-banking-crises-a-cross-country-3es264pn90.pdf

Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis

In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to deficiencies in the 1988 Capital Accord on credit risk. The main elements or ‘pillars’ of the proposal are capital requirements based on the internal risk-ratings of individual banks, expanded and active supervision, and information disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline. We discuss the incentive effects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we argue that it provides incentives for banks to develop new ways to evade the intended consequences of the proposed regulation. Supervision alone cannot prevent banks from ‘gaming and manipulation’ of risk-weights based on internal ratings. Furthermore, the proposed third pillar to enhance market discipline of banks’ risk-taking is too weak to achieve its objective. Market discipline can be strengthened by a requirement that banks issue subordinated debt. We propose a first phase for introducing a requirement for large banks to issue subordinated debt as part of the capital requirement.

/pdf/the-new-basel-capital-accord-making-it-effective-with-27xw8g89pw.pdf

Clas Wihlborg

Papers

The Dynamics of Capital Structure

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Banks' Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets

Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis

The New Basel Capital Accord: Making it Effective with Stronger Market Discipline