This article introduces a mode of social action and interaction that has so far been largely overlooked in the U.S.-dominated international relations debate between rational choice and social constructivism that focuses mainly on the differences between instrumental rationality and norm-guided behavior. Drawing on insights from a theoretical debate within the Germanspeaking international relations community, I suggest that actors have a third mode of social action at their disposal: arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any communicative statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world. Arguing and truth-seeking behavior presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus. The preconditions for argumentative rationality, particularly a “common lifeworld” and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually assumed. Arguing processes are more likely to occur the more actors are uncertain about their interests and even identities, the less they know about the situation in which they find themselves and the underlying “rules of the game,” and the more apparently irreconcilable differences prevent them from reaching an optimal rather than a merely satisfactory solution for a widely perceived problem (“problem solving”). Moreover, arguing is likely to increase the influence of the materially less powerful, be it small states or nonstate actors such as INGOs. I illustrate these claims empirically with two plausibility probes. The first concerns the East–West talks leading to a negotiated settlement of the Cold War in Europe and German unification within NATO. The second case focuses on the implementation of international human rights norms into domestic practices of Third World states.

“Let's Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics

of China (PRC) is more integrated into, and more cooperative within, regional and global political and economic systems than ever in its history. Yet there is growing uneasiness in the United States and the Asia-Paciac region about the implications of China’s increasing economic and military power. Characterizations of Chinese diplomacy in the policy and scholarly worlds are, if anything, less optimistic of late about China’s adherence to regional and international norms. In the 1980s there was little discussion in the United States and elsewhere about whether China was or was not part of something called “the international community.” Since the early 1990s, however, scholars and practitioners alike have argued increasingly that China has not demonstrated sufaciently that it will play by so-called international rules and that somehow it must be brought into this community. The subtext is a fairly sharp othering of China that includes a civilizing discourse (China is not yet a civilized state) or perhaps a sports discourse (China is a cheater). Many of the most vigorous policy debates in the United States in recent years have been over whether it is even possible to socialize a dictatorial, nationalistic, and dissatisaed China within this putative international community. Engagers argue that China is becoming socialized, though mainly in the sphere of economic norms (e.g., free trade and domestic marketization). Skeptics either conclude that this is not the case, due to the nature of the regime (for some, China is still Red China; for more sophisticated skeptics, China is oirting with fascism), or that it could not possibly happen because China as a rising power, by deanition, is dissatisaed with the U.S.-dominated global order (a power-transition realpolitik argument). A logical conclusion is that both groups view the problem of China’s rising power as the primary Is China a Status Quo Power?

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4137603.pdf

Is China a Status Quo Power

pinnings of international relations in Asia are undergoing profound change, and the rise of China is a principal cause. Other causes include the relative decline of U.S. inouence and authority in Asia, the expanding normative inouence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the growth of regional multilateral institutions, increased technological and economic interdependence throughout the region, and the amelioration of several formerly antagonistic bilateral relationships. As a result of these processes, the structure of power and the nature of the regional system are being fundamentally altered. China’s growing economic and military power, expanding political inouence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key developments in Asian affairs. China’s new proactive regional posture is reoected in virtually all policy spheres— economic, diplomatic, and military—and this parallels China’s increased activism on the global stage.1 Bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region. As a result, most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power. This regional perspective is striking, given that just a few years ago, many of China’s neighbors voiced growing concerns about the possibility of China becoming a domineering regional hegemon and powerful military threat. Today these views are muted. China’s new conadence is also reoected in how it perceives itself, as it gradually sheds its dual identity of historical victim and object of great power manipulation. These phenomena have begun to attract

China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order

1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

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A Cultural Theory of International Relations

his administration came into oface with a self-consciously realist orientation in foreign policy. The president and his advisers derided the Clinton administration’s multilateralism as mere form without national security substance. They viewed Russia and China as the main potential threats or sources of danger, and regarded Bill Clinton as a naive idealist for neglecting these great powers in favor of “foreign policy as social work”—humanitarian ventures in areas peripheral to U.S. national security concerns.1 Consistent with a realist suspicion of multilateralism and conadence in self-help, the administration’s principal foreign policy project in its arst months was the unilateral pursuit of ballistic missile defense. The Bush team was particularly critical of U.S. participation in quixotic efforts at nation building for failed states. As a candidate, Vice President Dick Cheney created a signiacant oap in August 2000 when he suggested that the Bush administration would end U.S. participation in NATO’s Bosnia mission.2 Condoleezza Rice, who would become Bush’s national security adviser, expressed dismayed amazement that U.S. troops were being used to take children to kindergarten in Bosnia.3 The message was clear: The Bush administration would not engage in state-building efforts.4

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Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States

the continued references to the "post-Cold War period." Yet such peri ods of transition are important, because they offer strategic opportunities. During these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the world to come. The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional global competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Union quaran tined itself and many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of international capitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own de struction, becoming in isolation an economic and technological dinosaur. But this is only part of the story. The Soviet Unions collapse coin cided with another great revolution. Dramatic changes in information technology and the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered

Promoting the National Interest

Preface Key Players Introduction: Solving the German Problem When Did the Cold War End? Revisiting the German Question The Fall of Ostpolitik and the Berlin Wall The Goal Becomes Unification The Process Becomes the Two Plus Four The Design for a New Germany Friendly Persuasion The Final Offer Germany Regains Its Sovereignty Epilogue: Germany Unified and Europe Transformed Notes Index

The Cold War's Endgame and German Unification: (A Review Essay)@@@A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity.@@@Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft.

Condoleezza Rice

Papers

Promoting the National Interest

The Cold War's Endgame and German Unification: (A Review Essay)@@@A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity.@@@Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft.

Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft

No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington

Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest