of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime The arst is so-called latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains a facade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program1 That country can then either withdraw from the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons as a hedge against future threats This was the path followed by the DPRK with its plutonium program and one that is likely being followed by Iran and more subtly by others The second broad challenge is arst-tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems2 The third challenge— the focus of this article—is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in Proliferation Rings

Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Little evidence underpins existing sweeping assertions about the connection between weak or failing states and transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation, or disease, even though policy is being implemented accordingly. What characteristics of state weakness are really associated with which dangers?

Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?

In a groundbreaking study of China’s ties with Pakistan, Andrew Small (Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the USA) provides an invaluable addition to advancing our knowledge of this relationship in this timely and informative book. The Epilogue in the updated edition covers developments over the last year, which Small sees as the “ChinaPak Axis stepping out of the shadows further and faster than anyone had expected”.

The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics

Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/27798489.pdf

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress (2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America). One of the dominant influences shaping contemporary North‐South relations is the perception that the main threats to international security emanate disproportionately from poorly governed states in the developing world. Beyond representing the hard core of today’s development challenge, such countries are said to enable a host of transnational dangers from terrorism to weapons proliferation, organized crime, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophes, and energy insecurity (Crocker 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2004:13; Fukuyama 2004:92; Rice 2006). This perception is particularly prominent within advanced market democracies, and notably the United States, where it has gained the status of conventional wisdom. In response, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments have begun to adapt their defense, diplomatic, and development policies and instruments to help prevent state failure and respond to its aftermath as well as to try to quarantine themselves from the presumed ‘‘spillover’’ effects of state weakness. Such moves have been mirrored by those of international institutions, including the United Nations and the World Bank. What is striking is how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to document and explore the connection between state failure and transnational security threats (Patrick 2006a). Scholars and policymakers have advanced blanket associations between these two sets of phenomena, often on the basis of anecdotes or single examples (e.g., al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan) rather than through sober analysis of global patterns or in-depth case studies that reveal causal linkages. These sweeping generalizations provide little analytical insight or guidance for policymakers, since they fail to distinguish among categories of weak and failing states or to ask whether (and how) particular developing countries are associated with particular threats. Three things have been missing from the discussion. One is appreciation that states in the developing world vary along a continuum in terms of institutional strength, both overall and in particular spheres; equally important, their level of dysfunction can represent a variable mixture of inadequate capacity and insufficient will (Patrick 2006b). A second is a nuanced appreciation of the complex linkages between state weakness, on the one hand, and a country’s propensity to

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4621865.pdf

"Failed" States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas'

The Khan network has caused enormous damage to U.S. national security and international stability. Yet, the response has been insufficient, producing little confidence that other networks do not or will not exist or that elements of the Khan network will not reconstitute themselves.

/pdf/unraveling-the-a-q-khan-and-future-proliferation-networks-3cnpr5xiy5.pdf

Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks

Algeria: Big Deal in the Desert?:

After Iran's first story of how it acquired uranium enrichment technology was rejected, evidence of a more complex procurement network began to emerge.

The centrifuge connection

The United States wanted the Security Council to sanction Iran, but the European Union preferred to make a deal. Now Iran appears to have backed out of their agreement …

Corey Hinderstein

Papers

Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks

Algeria: Big Deal in the Desert?:

The centrifuge connection

IRAN: Countdown to SHOWDOWN

Iran, Player or Rogue?