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Showing papers by "David J. Teece published in 1982"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of the multiproduct firm is presented, in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets.
Abstract: This paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm. Important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation, market imperfections, and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge, including its fungible and taut character. A framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets. Neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient.

1,656 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: This article tests a transactions cost theory of vertical integration with data from the U S. automobile industry. Existing theory is first refined to take into account industrial know-how and the cost of transferring such know-how. A testable model is then developed, which is estimated by using probit techniques. The results support the view that transactions cost considerations surrounding the development and deepening of human skills have important ramifications ]br delineating efficient organizational boundaries.

1,118 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Quasi-vertical integration as mentioned in this paper differs from full vertical integration in that the downstream firm still contracts with a supplier for the actual manufacture of the component, whereas with full vertical Integration the production process itself is internalized.
Abstract: A common organizational form in industrial economies is what may be called quasi-vertical integration: the ownership by a downstream firm of the specialized tools, dies, jigs, and patterns used in the fabrication of components for larger systems.' In the automobile industry, for instance, Crandall notes that "assemblers have always insisted upon ownership of all special tooling utilized by suppliers in fabricating parts for the vehicle companies. Even if the supplier manufactures the tooling himself, it immediately becomes the property of the assembler.''2 Similarly, the ownership by assemblers of specialized molds and patterns housed in suppliers' facilities has been noted in the plastics and steam turbine industries.3 Quasi-vertical integration differs from full vertical integration in that the downstream firm still contracts with a supplier for the actual manufacture of the component, whereas with full vertical integration the production process itself is internalized.

264 citations


Book
01 Dec 1982
TL;DR: The Future of OPEC and the Long Run Price of Oil as mentioned in this paper is a monograph that summarizes the authors' views on the long run price of oil in the 1970s and 1980s.
Abstract: Because of concerns for the textbook treatment of OPEC and its cartel properties, a conference was called in Houston on May 8, 1981, to discuss The Future of OPEC and the Long Run Price of Oil. This book had its genesis at that conference. The editors attempted to weave the proceedings into a unified monograph and found a large degree of commonality among the various views put forward. In a concluding chapter, the editors emphasize that the 1970s was a very unusual decade - the economic and social fabric of industrial countries being trained by a quantum leap in the relative price of energy. They expect the price uncertainty to continue in the 80s, but suggest that reductions in the real price are as likely as further increases. A separate abstract was prepared for each of the other 8 chapters.

95 citations