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David M. Reeb

Researcher at National University of Singapore

Publications -  82
Citations -  17242

David M. Reeb is an academic researcher from National University of Singapore. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Debt. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 75 publications receiving 15651 citations. Previous affiliations of David M. Reeb include University of Alabama & Temple University.

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Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

TL;DR: The authors investigated the relation between founding-family ownership and firm performance and found that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity.
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Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impact of audit committee characteristics on corporate yields spreads as audit committees are the direct mechanism that boards use to monitor the financial accounting process and found that fully independent audit committee are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing.
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Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the impact of the founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt and find that it is common in large publicly traded firms and is related to a lower cost for debt financing.
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Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt

TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that the cost of debt is inversely related to board independence and board size, and that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost.
Posted Content

Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms

TL;DR: This paper found that the most valuable public firms are those in which independent directors balance family board representation, and that moderate family board presence provides substantial benefits to the firm, while outside shareholders seek independent board representation.