Political socialization research holds the distinction of benefiting, possibly more fully than other subfields of study, from conceptual and empirical contributions from many academic disciplines. While the main emphases of scholars from different fields may reflect certain intradisciplinary perspectives, the cumulative product is distinctly interdisciplinary, as seen in the widescope of contemporary research findings. Educators have been concerned with the role of the schools in the political socialization process, while sociologists have directed attention more broadly toward the roles of many potential agencies of political socialization. Psychologists, focusing upon political socialization as a learning process, have directed attention to learning and developmental theories. Political scientists have examined both the antecedents and consequences of the socialization process.

Political Socialization: A Topical Bibliography.

Britain enjoys a textbook reputation as the historic home and model representative of a stable two-party system. From the factors most frequently cited by way of explanation – the electoral system, the absence of cross-cutting social cleavages – it is implied that this uncommon state of affairs is a natural and permanent part of British politics. This reputation is, in fact, somewhat exaggerated. At no time have MPs or parliamentary candidates in Britain been confined to two parties only (in contrast to the United States); and for most of the period since the introduction of the majority male franchise and the beginning of mass parties in 1884 the configuration of party forces in the Commons would be best described as multi-party (1884–1922), three-party (1922–31), or dominant one-party (1931–45). Britain's experience of a stable two-party politics has therefore been both recent and relatively short-lived; it is only since the Second World War that two parties – Conservative and Labour – have alternated in exclusive incumbency of government office on the basis of an evenly balanced duopoly of electoral support and parliamentary seats.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/E2B261A619288A402A7DAC5A93A78C79/S0007123400000922a.pdf/div-class-title-partisan-dealignment-in-britain-1964-1974-div.pdf

Partisan Dealignment in Britain 1964–1974

This paper focuses on the analysis of determinants of public education spending in OECD countries. It starts out by reviewing and replicating the model presented by Castles (1989, 1998), finding that only a few of his explanatory variables remain significant in a pooled time-series framework. I present an alternative model that contains socio-economic, political, and institutional variables: the level of economic development, the magnitude of demographic demand, the constitutional veto structure, the level of public social expenditures, the degree of tax-revenue decentralization as well as government participation of conservative parties.

/pdf/determinants-of-public-education-spending-in-21-oecd-1k8v2l260f.pdf

Determinants of public education spending in 21 OECD democracies, 1980–2001

Otto Kirchheimer has argued that a transformation of Western European party systems is under way. If Kirchheimer's assertions about the emergence and success of catch‐all parties are correct, we should discover decreased fragmentation in Western European party systems. However, there is little evidence for this. In recent years many party systems have become more, rather than less, fragmented. Catch‐all parties have succeeded only in countries which experienced crises and disruptions in development. Elsewhere the strength of partisan attachments prevent the success of catch‐all parties. Increased fragmentation in the 1970s reflects the weakening of partisan attachments, the emergence of new concerns, and growing reactions against goverment policies and practices. Minor parties have gained support because they were better able to mobilise discontent and fulfil the expressive functions of political parties.

The transformation of Western European party systems revisited

The ‘primacy principle’ comprises three assumptions about political orientations. The first is that they are learned during childhood. The second is that this childhood learning further shapes any subsequent modifications of them. The third is that the scale of any such subsequent modifications is small: fundamental political orientations tend to endure through life. We propose, using cohort analysis, to examine the extent to which three political orientations – party identification, political efficacy and political trust – do, as a matter of fact, endure through adulthood.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0007123400000533

The Primacy Principle: Attitude Change and Political Socialization

Drawing on the implications suggested by several recent studies in comparative public policy, this article examines the impact of the structure of intergovernmental relations on the patterns of distribution of educational funds. The fundamental hypothesis underlying this analysis is that differences in this structure, and in particular the distinction between federal and unitary systems of government, are systematically related to differences in distribution across and within nations. The variations in total educational allocations among eighteen nations in Europe and North America are considered in order to discover whether the aggregate funding of education, relative to a nation's wealth, is related to the structure of intergovernmental relations. Then, in a more intensive analysis, the intranational patterns of distribution are compared in four federal and four unitary systems. This analysis suggests that there is a significant difference between the two types of system in the degree to which educational policy outputs equalize the territorial disparities in wealth and effect a redistribution of funds within the nation.

/pdf/the-impact-of-federalism-on-education-finance-a-comparative-4agp893w4e.pdf

The impact of federalism on education finance: a comparative analysis*

CO ONVERSE AND DUPEUX, in their well-known study of politicization in the French and American electorates, suspect that the "flash party" phenomenon in France (the Gaullist R.P.F. in 1947-1951, the Poujadist U.F.F. in 1956, and the Gaullist U.N.R. in 1958) occurs because a considerable portion of the electorate is not anchored to self-reinforcing long-term partisan commitments.' While 75 percent of the American sample identified with a political party, less than half of the 1958 French sample identified with a party or a tendance such as "left" or "right." Noting that the difference in proportions able to classify the father's partisanship revealed an even greater cross-national difference-86 percent of the American sample but only 26 percent of the French sampleConverse and Dupeux compared levels of partisanship in the two samples after controlling for knowledge of father's partisanship. The controlling operation removed the cross-national difference in partisanship to the marginals, i.e. to the difference in the proportion of respondents in each sample who were aware of their father's partisanship. This led the authors to conclude that the difference in

Stability and change in patterns of french partisanship

Urbanization, Social Structure, and Mass Politics: A Comparison Within Five Nations

The task of comparative political inquiry is to increase knowledge by structuring explanations in a manner which allows cross-national comparison. But the current language of comparative research is permeated with descriptions of behaviour which celebrate the uniqueness of particular systems. Nowhere is this more true, and the influence of the area specialist more pervasive, than in the study of French politics. Scholars such as Stanley Hoffmann, Michel Crozier,2 and Frangois Goguel3 have presented, with considerable elegance, theories which describe patterns of psychological style, authority relations, and political partisanship in France. Unfortunately, most of the explanations rely upon reference to phenomena which are considered to be uniquely French. One of the more frequent examples of this involves the French family. Not only is the family perceived to be of critical importance for the development of authority relations, patterns of interpersonal communication, and social and political behaviour, but it is also perceived to be unique, if not peculiar. As a result, whatever appears in French social and political life without a ready explanation is often accounted for by the peculiarities of French family life. Such explanations have not only suffered from a dearth of corroborating empirical evidence. They have, by relying on the unique attributes of France and by neglecting any explanatory variables which might be present in a variety of systems, failed to structure relationships in a truly comparative manner that is, one in which cross-national variations are attributed to the variation in certain common

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0008423900034685

David R. Cameron

Papers

The impact of federalism on education finance: a comparative analysis*

Stability and change in patterns of french partisanship

Urbanization, Social Structure, and Mass Politics: A Comparison Within Five Nations

Non-Family Agents of Political Socialization: A Reassessment of Converse and Dupeux

Continuity and Change in Gaullism: The General's Legacy