计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

25. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. By D. B. Rubin. ISBN 0 471 08705 X. Wiley, Chichester, 1987. 258 pp. £30.25.

Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys

This paper outlines a new approach to the study of the welfare state. Contrary to the emphasis on “decommmodification” in the current literature, we argue that important dimensions of the welfare state – employment protection, unemployment protection, and wage protection – are designed to make workers more willing to invest in firmand industry-specific skills that increase their dependence on particular employers and their vulnerability to market fluctuations. Workers will only make such risky investments when they have some insurance that their job or income is secure. Otherwise, they will invest in general, and therefore portable, skills. In turn, because the skill composition of the work force constrains the set of product market strategies that firms can pursue successfully, employers will support social protection that facilitates the set of skills they need to be competitive in particular international product markets. We show that our argument is consistent with observed clusters of social protection and skill profiles among OECD countries, and that these clusters are associated with very different distributional outcomes and patterns of gender-specific labor market segmentation.

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/apsa993.pdf

Social protection and the formation of skills: a reinterpretation of the welfare state

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

* Abstract: Active labour market policy is an important tool for governments interested in the promotion of employment. This article explores a topic in the comparative political economy in need of more attention: the politics behind the promotion of active labour policies. I argue that social democratic governments are often not interested in employment promotion measures. I divide labour into those with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders). I contend that social democratic governments have strong incentives to pursue labour market policies that benefit insiders but not outsiders. There are factors, however, that either exacerbate or limit the effects of insider-outsider differences on social democracy. I test my claims in three ways. First, I explore the interplay of government partisanship and employment protection in the British case. Second, I test the individual preferences assumed in the model with Eurobarometer data. And third, I look at the effects of social democracy on active labour market policy using data from sixteen industrialized democracies. Paper prepared for presentation at the "Challenges to the Welfare State" Conference. Minda de

Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Employment Promotion

Why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted? And why is it that in other countries, where inequality has increased much less, the Left has become substantially more redistributive? The answer, the authors argue, has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low-income voters. The authors make two points in this article. First, high levels of inequality move Left parties to the left. Second, although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of Left parties to the left, it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics. The authors argue that Left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low-income voters are politically mobilized. They explore these claims through a comparative analysis of Left party programs in 10 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries over the period 1966 to 2002.

/pdf/the-politics-of-inequality-voter-mobilization-and-left-15jqvj0c6l.pdf

The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left Parties in Advanced Industrial States

Active labour-market policy is an important tool for governments interested in the promotion of employment. This article explores a topic in the comparative political economy literature in need of more attention: the politics behind the promotion of active labour policies. It is argued here that social democratic governments are often not interested in employment promotion measures; labour is divided into those with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders); it is contended that social democratic governments have strong incentives to pursue labour-market policies that benefit insiders but not outsiders. There are factors, however, that either exacerbate or limit the effects of insider–outsider differences on social democracy. These claims are tested in three ways. First, the interplay of government partisanship and employment protection is explored in the British case. Secondly, the individual preferences assumed in the model are tested with Eurobarometer data. And thirdly, the effects of social democracy on active labour-market policy are analysed using data from sixteen industrialized democracies.

/pdf/social-democracy-and-active-labour-market-policies-insiders-3ejvxe6vni.pdf

Social Democracy and Active Labour-Market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Promotion

The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that indirect taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at indirect taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: indirect taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements. The demand for redistribution is fairly inelastic across industrialized democracies. Even when social expenditures become very expensive, the demand for them decreases with great difficulty. 1 A cursory examination of fiscal policy across OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation Development) governments reveals a striking fact: the countries more often ruled by social democratic parties are also characterized by the highest tax burden on consumption income and the highest levels of welfare state effort throughout the 1965–95 period. If taxes on consumption are seen as a regressive fiscal device applied to general consumption goods (rather than luxury goods), this pattern poses a puzzle for partisanship theory. Social democratic parties are assumed to protect the interests of citizens in the bottom half of the income distribution, 2 and yet they seem to make ample use of a tool that clearly undermines this goal. How can we explain the coexistence of large redistributive efforts on the expenditure side with the use of regressive tools on the revenue side?

/pdf/social-democracy-constrained-indirect-taxation-in-3m4ltzji8z.pdf

Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies

In this article we aim to return labor (particularly the most vulnerable members of the labor market) to the core of the comparative political economy of advanced democracies. We formulate a framework with which to conceptualize cheap labor in advanced democracies. We propose that to understand the politics of cheap labor, the weakest members of the labor market need to be divided into two structural groups: those in standard and those in nonstandard employment. Standard cheap labor includes “regular jobs” while nonstandard cheap labor includes low-cost, flexible, and temporary jobs. We show that the use of cheap labor is significant in all industrialized democracies but that there are important contrasts in how different economies use cheap labor. We argue that there is a trade-off between standard and nonstandard cheap labor. Countries that satisfy their need for cheap labor through standard employment do not develop large nonstandard sectors of their economies. Countries that do not promote cheap labor in the standard sector, on the other hand, end up relying on an army of nonstandard workers to meet their cheap labor needs.

/pdf/cheap-labor-the-new-politics-of-bread-and-roses-in-1mk7p5xkt6.pdf

David Rueda

Papers

Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Employment Promotion

The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left Parties in Advanced Industrial States

Social Democracy and Active Labour-Market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Promotion

Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies

Cheap Labor: The New Politics of “Bread and Roses” in Industrial Democracies