计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

25. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. By D. B. Rubin. ISBN 0 471 08705 X. Wiley, Chichester, 1987. 258 pp. £30.25.

Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys

This paper outlines a new approach to the study of the welfare state. Contrary to the emphasis on “decommmodification” in the current literature, we argue that important dimensions of the welfare state – employment protection, unemployment protection, and wage protection – are designed to make workers more willing to invest in firmand industry-specific skills that increase their dependence on particular employers and their vulnerability to market fluctuations. Workers will only make such risky investments when they have some insurance that their job or income is secure. Otherwise, they will invest in general, and therefore portable, skills. In turn, because the skill composition of the work force constrains the set of product market strategies that firms can pursue successfully, employers will support social protection that facilitates the set of skills they need to be competitive in particular international product markets. We show that our argument is consistent with observed clusters of social protection and skill profiles among OECD countries, and that these clusters are associated with very different distributional outcomes and patterns of gender-specific labor market segmentation.

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/apsa993.pdf

Social protection and the formation of skills: a reinterpretation of the welfare state

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.

Insider-Outsider Politics

Century (from the Great Depression to the recessions ofthe 1970s) were met with signiﬁcant increases in compensation and protection for thosemost vulnerable to unemployment. Why has the Great Recession that started in 2007 pro-moted such muted responses from the welfare states of industrialized democracies? In thefollowing pages I argue that labor market dualization is a signiﬁcant part of the answer.Dualization (an increasing separation between insiders and outsiders) has become an inﬂu-ential feature of most OECD economies since 1980. While a politically signiﬁcant portionof insiders enjoys steadily high levels of employment protection, an increasingly numerousgroup of outsiders are unemployed or in precarious employment. Without the support ofinsiders, whose vulnerability to unemployment even during a crisis is low, governmentshave few incentives to promote generous social policy. I will show below that dualizationhas insulated insiders from unemployment during the crisis and has therefore mitigated theresponsiveness of the welfare state to unemployment.

/pdf/dualization-and-crisis-aqxeubh1nf.pdf

Dualization and Crisis

While a significant literature in political economy has recently focused on the relationship between inequality and redistribution preferences, it is unclear that these preferences have any influence over political behavior. In this paper we argue that redistribution preferences are indeed a most significant determinant of voting. We will show that voting for the Democratic Party by the rich is highly dependent on state inequality levels. The rich in more unequal states are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal states. We contend that it is precisely these redistribution preferences that make them more likely to vote for the Democratic Party. Our analysis goes beyond previous research by explicitly studying this preference mechanism in a potential-outcomes framework. We disentangle the direct and indirect effects of inequality to obtain estimates of inequality’s effect on voting through preferences. †University of Oxford, david.rueda@politics.ox.ac.uk ‡University of Mannheim, mail@daniel-stegmueller.com

Preferences that Matter: Inequality, Redistribution and Voting

Most distributive theories in political economy understand individuals to be motivated by material self-interest, often approximated by their current positions in the income distribution. In this paper, we challenge this traditional view. The key to our argument is that individual preferences for more or less redistribution are the result of agents maximizing their life-cycle income, and not just their current income. Based on the labour economics literature on life-cycle profiles (Mincer 1974, Solon: 1992, Baker 1997, Haider & Solon 2006), we propose a simple way of estimating the present value of an individual's expected future income. As expectations about life-cycle incomes are the resultant of the interplay of age and education, our approach offers promising new insights into the effects of these variables on redistribution preferences. We use data from the European Social Survey to estimate expected life-cycle incomes and evaluate the extent to which our approach improves our understanding of distributive politics.

Redistribution Preferences and Life-Cycle Income

The understanding of observable associations between institutions and in- equality today requires a better grasp of the process driving the selection of economic institutions, in particular wage bargaining centralization agree- ments, as the outcome of a distributive conflict in which inequality itself plays a prominent role. Low levels of inequality facilitated the adoption of encompassing wage centralization agreements during the early twentieth century in Europe, thereby creating a long-term association between low inequality and high centralization that, for a large subset of cases, remained stable throughout the century. We develop a theoretical argument as to why inequality should lead to lower levels of coordination and test it against com- peting hypotheses on the basis of a database on 11 OECD nations between the 1910s and the 1950s.

/pdf/inequality-and-institutions-the-case-of-economic-2bjv98wmj4.pdf

David Rueda

Papers

Insider-Outsider Politics

Dualization and Crisis

Preferences that Matter: Inequality, Redistribution and Voting

Redistribution Preferences and Life-Cycle Income

Inequality and Institutions: The Case of Economic