D
Dengji Zhao
Researcher at ShanghaiTech University
Publications - 69
Citations - 464
Dengji Zhao is an academic researcher from ShanghaiTech University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Common value auction. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 53 publications receiving 320 citations. Previous affiliations of Dengji Zhao include University of Western Ontario & University of Toulouse.
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Redistribution Mechanism on Networks
Wen Zhang,Dengji Zhao,Hanyu Chen +2 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a network-based redistribution mechanism was proposed to make the resource allocation more efficient, where participants are incentivized to invite more participants and the resource owner does not earn or lose much money from the allocation.
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Incentive Design for Ridesharing with Uncertainty.
TL;DR: This work proposes an ex-post truthful mechanism that pays a commuter if she undertakes her trip, otherwise she is penalized for not undertaking her trip and identifies a sufficient and necessary condition under which this mechanism is ex- post truthful.
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Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions
Bin Li,Dong Hao,Dengji Zhao +2 more
TL;DR: This work identifies a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) diffusion auctions, formulates the monotonic allocation policies in such multidimensional problems and shows that any monotony allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism.
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Diffusion and Auction on Graphs
TL;DR: In this paper, a new class of incentive-compatible auction mechanisms on graphs is proposed, which promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions
Bin Li,Dong Hao,Dengji Zhao +2 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive compatible diffusion auctions and show that any monotonic allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism.