中枢神経系疾患の治療は正常細胞（ニューロン）の機能維持を目的とするが，脳血管障害のように機能障害の原因が細胞の死滅に基づくことは多い．一方，脳腫瘍の治療においては薬物療法や放射線療法といった腫瘍細胞の死滅を目標とするものが大きな位置を占める．いずれの場合にも，細胞死の機序を理解することは各種病態や治療法の理解のうえで重要である．現在のところ最も研究の進んでいる細胞死の型はアポトーシスである．そのなかで重要な位置を占めるミトコンドリアにおける反応および抗アポトーシス因子について概要を紹介する．

Neuroscience 細胞死：最近の知見

1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

Taking Rights Seriously

Scholars of culture, humanities and social sciences have increasingly come to an appreciation of the importance of the legal domain in social life, while critically engaged socio-legal scholars around the world have taken up the task of understanding "Law's Empire" in all of its cultural, political, and economic dimensions. The questions arising from these intersections, and addressing imperialisms past and present forms the subject matter of a special symposium issue of Social Identities under the editorship of Griffith University's Rob McQueen, and UBC's Wes Pue and with contributions from McQueen, Ian Duncanson, Renisa Mawani, David Williams, Emma Cunliffe, Chidi Oguamanam, W. Wesley Pue, Fatou Camara, and Dianne Kirkby. This paper introduces the volume, forthcoming in late 2007. The central problematique of this issue has previously been explored through the 2005 Law's Empire conference, an informal but vibrant postcolonial legal studies network.

Law's Empire

Naming and necessity

The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century

A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory

Taking up a single question-"What does it mean to say a proposition of law is true?"-this book advances a major new account of truth in law. Drawing upon the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, as well as more recent postmodern theory of the relationship between language, meaning, and the world, Patterson examines leading contemporary jurisprudential approaches to this question and finds them flawed in similar and previously unnoticed ways. He offers a powerful alternative account of legal justification, one in which linguistic practice-the use of forms of legal argument-holds the key to legal meaning.

Law and Truth

In this Preface to the paperback edition of Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (Oxford University Press, 2015), we consider some of the commentary on the book and we clarify our positions in the ever-growing field of law and neuroscience.

Preface to the Paperback Edition of Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

This is the table of contents and introductory chapter to our book, Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013). The book explores several philosophical issues at the intersection of law and neuroscience. It examines and critically assesses arguments for an increased role for neuroscience at the levels of legal theory, legal doctrine, and legal proof. The theoretical issues include general jurisprudential questions about the nature of law, moral and economic decision making, and justifications for criminal punishment. The doctrinal issues focus on criminal law and criminal procedure and include: mens rea, actus reus, the insanity defense, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and due process. The issues of legal proof focus on different types of brain-based lie detection.

Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Interpretation is a familiar feature of law and legal practice. For some legal theorists, interpretation is a central - even foundational - aspect of law. I argue that interpretation is a parasitic activity in legal practice. In other words, I want to disagree with those who make the case for interpretation as a basic or fundamental feature of law. While interpretation is certainly an important element of legal practice, it is an activity that depends upon existing and widespread agreement among legal practitioners with respect to most features of legal practice. In short, interpretation is not the firmament of law. The need for interpretation arises from the firmament of praxis. That is, interpretation in law arises from established forms of action that all participants recognize and employ whenever they make, appraise, and adjudicate claims about the state of the law. Interpretation is grounded in a distinct form of discursive action that we recognize as legal in nature. Thus, before we can truly understand the role of interpretation in law, we must first explicate the particular form of understanding we identify as legal. Only with a clear view of the nature of understanding in law can we then properly explicate the nature and scope of interpretation in law. When we look at how participants in law engage in interpretation, the activity can best be described by three general principles. These principles capture what it is that lawyers do when they, of necessity, interpret the law.

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Dennis Patterson

Papers

A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory

Law and Truth

Preface to the Paperback Edition of Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Interpretation in Law