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Modern Applied Statistics With S

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

The Intentional Stance

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with oth- ers and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The develop- mental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

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Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cogni- tive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mecha- nism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicar- iousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproduc- tive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teach- ing, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empa- thy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of de- velopment, and situations.

/pdf/empathy-its-ultimate-and-proximate-bases-3gnr9okjki.pdf

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.

We argue that an understanding of the faculty of language requires substantial interdisciplinary cooperation. We suggest how current developments in linguistics can be profitably wedded to work in evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience. We submit that a distinction should be made between the faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB)and in the narrow sense (FLN) . FLB includes a sensory-motor system, a conceptual-intentional system, and the computational mechanisms for recursion, providing the capacity to generate an infinite range of expressions from a finite set of elements. We hypothesize that FLN only includes recursion and is the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language. We further argue that FLN may have evolved for reasons other than language, hence comparative studies might look for evidence of such computations outside of the domain of communication (for example, number, navigation, and social relations).

/pdf/the-faculty-of-language-what-is-it-who-has-it-and-how-did-it-2ls6go98wi.pdf

The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?

Previous research has suggested that the quiet, tonal grunts given by female savanna baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) function to mollify lower-ranking females and thereby facilitate friendly social interaction with them (Cheney et al., 1995). In a two-year study of wild chacma baboons, we assessed whether or not grunts given by adult males function similarly to facilitate heterosexual interaction. Two patterns of male vocal behavior initially suggested this function. First, males grunted more often when approaching females with which social interaction was potentially highly beneficial and/or unlikely (due to female evasion), i.e. estrus females and lactating females (particularly friend females); males rarely grunted when approaching pregnant females. Second, higher-ranking males grunted significantly more often than subordinates when approaching females in most reproductive states. In spite of these two patterns, however, male grunts had contrasting effects on the probability of supplanting a female and interacting affinitively with her. Supplanting of females was just as common when the approaching male grunted as when he did not. Instead, variance in supplanting was better explained by female avoidance of high-ranking and non-friend males than by the male's vocal behavior. Results suggest that male grunts themselves do not generally determine whether a supplant of the female occurs. Rather, the female's reproductive state and social relationship with the male (i.e. his 'friendship' status and/or rank) affect both the male's tendency to call to her and the female's tendency to move away from him. In contrast to supplanting, affinitive interaction occurred significantly more often when males grunted than when they silently approached females. Taken together, results suggest that a female chacma baboon's 'spatial' response to a male's approach ('stay or leave') depends upon her assessment of non-vocal factors, but her 'social' response ('interact or not') is influenced by the grunts given by the male.

Male grunts as mediators of social interaction with females in wild chacma baboons (papio cynocephalus ursinus)

Many of the vocalizations produced by non-human primates are functionally semantic, in the sense that they denote objects and events in the external world. Moreover, at least some monkey species appear to assess and compare calls on the basis of their meanings. In their social interactions, non-human primates also use their calls in ways that are functionally analogous to the ways that human use language. The grunts given by free-ranging baboons, for example, serve to facilitate social interactions and to reconcile opponents following fights. The mental mechanisms underlying the vocalizations of non-human primates, however, appear to be fundamentally different from those that underlie human speech, because monkeys do not apparently call to one another with the intent of modifying or influencing each other's mental states. The alarm and contact calls of monkeys provide information about the signaller's current physical and mental states, but they are not deliberately given to inform or instruct others. Instead, listeners appear to extract relevant information about a call's function based on behavioural contingencies and their own experiences

Function and Intention in the Calls of Non-Human Primates

Social bonds in female baboons: the interaction between personality, kinship and rank

Mountain gorillas (Gorilla gorilla beringei) give double-grunts to one another in a variety of situations, when feeding, resting, moving, or engaged in other kinds of social behavior. Some double-grunts elicit double-grunts in reply whereas others do not. Double-grunts are individually distinctive, and high-ranking animals give double-grunts at higher rates than others. There was no evidence, however, that the probability of eliciting a reply depended upon either the animals' behavior at the time a call was given or the social relationship between caller and respondent. The probability of eliciting a reply could be predicted from a double-grunt's acoustic features. Gorillas apparently produce at least two acoustically different subtypes of double-grunts, each of which conveys different information. Double-grunts with a low second formant (typically 1600 Hz) are given by animals within 5 s of a call from another individual and rarely elicit replies. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Dorothy L. Cheney

Papers

Male grunts as mediators of social interaction with females in wild chacma baboons (papio cynocephalus ursinus)

Function and Intention in the Calls of Non-Human Primates

Social bonds in female baboons: the interaction between personality, kinship and rank

The acoustic features of gorilla double grunts and their relation to behavior

Meaning and mind in monkeys.