Douglas Lichtman

TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare profitability under the assumption that information goods are used only by their direct purchasers, with the more realistic assumption that goods are sometimes shared within small social communities.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that a firm trailing in a given patent race has an incentive to disclose information in the hopes of preempting a rival's patent, but only if the laggard itself has little chance of leapfrogging the leader and winning the race.

TL;DR: The authors found that sharing can increase profit even if sharing is inefficient in the sense that it is more expensive for consumers to distribute the good via sharing than it would be for the producer to simply produce additional units.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce a variety of common law doctrines and statutory provisions and evaluate them from an economic perspective, emphasizing that every mechanism for rewarding authors inevitably introduces some form of inefficiency, and thus the only way to determine the proper scope for indirect liability is to weigh its costs and benefits against those associated with other plausible mechanisms for rewarding individuals.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider an externality that affects a broad range of markets, specifically markets where one set of firms sells some platform technology such as a computer, video game console, or operating system, while another possibly overlapping set of sellers sells peripherals compatible with that platform, for example, computer software or video game cartridges.