/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

Convergence of Probability Measures. By P. Billingsley. Chichester, Sussex, Wiley, 1968. xii, 253 p. 9 1/4“. 117s.

Convergence of Probability Measures

Building Leadership Effectiveness This program encourages leaders to develop practices that transform values into action, vision into realities, obstacles into innovations, and risks into rewards. Participants will be introduced to the five practices of exemplary leadership: modeling the way, inspiring a shared vision, challenging the process, enabling others to act, and encouraging the heart Coaching & Communicating for Performance Coaching & Communicating for Performance is a highly interactive program that will give supervisors and managers the opportunity to build skills that will enable them to share expectations and set objectives for employees, provide constructive feedback, more effectively engage in learning conversations, and coaching opportunities. Skillful Conflict Management for Leaders As a leader, it is important to understand conflict and be effective at conflict management because the way conflict is resolved becomes an integral component of our university’s culture. This series of conflict management sessions help leaders learn and put into practice effective strategies for managing conflict.

기독교 사역과 Leadership

Preface to the revised edition Remarks on notation 1. Basic examples 2. Characterization and existence 3. Stable processes and their extensions 4. The Levy-Ito decomposition of sample functions 5. Distributional properties of Levy processes 6. Subordination and density transformation 7. Recurrence and transience 8. Potential theory for Levy processes 9. Wiener-Hopf factorizations 10. More distributional properties Supplement Solutions to exercises References and author index Subject index.

Lévy processes and infinitely divisible distributions

Stochastic equations in infinite dimensions

The problem of robust utility maximization in an incomplete market with volatility uncertainty is considered, in the sense that the volatility of the market is only assumed to lie between two given bounds. The set of all possible models (probability measures) considered here is nondominated. We propose studying this problem in the framework of second-order backward stochastic differential equations (2BSDEs for short) with quadratic growth generators. We show for exponential, power, and logarithmic utilities that the value function of the problem can be written as the initial value of a particular 2BSDE and prove existence of an optimal strategy. Finally, several examples which shed more light on the problem and its links with the classical utility maximization one are provided. In particular, we show that in some cases, the upper bound of the volatility interval plays a central role, exactly as in the option pricing problem with uncertain volatility models.

Robust utility maximization in nondominated models with 2bsde: the uncertain volatility model

We consider a general formulation of the principal–agent problem with a lump-sum payment on a finite horizon, providing a systematic method for solving such problems. Our approach is the following. We first find the contract that is optimal among those for which the agent’s value process allows a dynamic programming representation, in which case the agent’s optimal effort is straightforward to find. We then show that the optimization over this restricted family of contracts represents no loss of generality. As a consequence, we have reduced a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game to a stochastic control problem which may be addressed by standard tools of control theory. Our proofs rely on the backward stochastic differential equations approach to non-Markovian stochastic control, and more specifically on the recent extensions to the second order case.

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Dynamic Programming Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

In the context of the multi-dimensional infinite horizon optimal consumption investment problem with small proportional transaction costs, we prove an asymptotic expansion. Similar to the one-dimensional derivation in our accompanying paper, the first order term is expressed in terms of a singular ergodic control problem. Our arguments are based on the theory of viscosity solutions and the techniques of homogenization which leads to a system of corrector equations. In contrast with the one-dimensional case, no explicit solution of the first corrector equation is available and we also prove the existence of a corrector and its properties. Finally, we provide some numerical results which illustrate the structure of the first order optimal controls.

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Homogenization and Asymptotics for Small Transaction Costs: The Multidimensional Case

The problem of robust hedging requires to solve the problem of superhedging under a nondominated family of singular measures. Recent progress was achieved by van Handel, Neufeld, and Nutz. We show that the dual formulation of this problem is valid in a context suitable for martingale optimal transportation or, more generally, for optimal transportation under controlled stochastic dynamics.

/pdf/on-the-robust-superhedging-of-measurable-claims-2yygss09jt.pdf

On the Robust superhedging of measurable claims

We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the principal observes the output continuously, the principal can compute the quadratic variation of the output, but not the individual components. This leads to moral hazard with respect to the risk choices of the agent. We identify a family of admissible contracts for which the optimal agent's action is explicitly characterized, and, using the recent theory of singular changes of measures for Ito processes, we study how restrictive this family is. In particular, in the special case of the standard Homlstrom-Milgrom model with fixed volatility, the family includes all possible contracts. We solve the principal-agent problem in the case of CARA preferences, and show that the optimal contract is linear in these factors: the contractible sources of risk, including the output, the quadratic variation of the output and the cross-variations between the output and the contractible risk sources. Thus, like sample Sharpe ratios used in practice, path-dependent contracts naturally arise when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management. In a numerical example, we show that the loss of efficiency can be significant if the principal does not use the quadratic variation component of the optimal contract.

Dylan Possamaï

Papers

Robust utility maximization in nondominated models with 2bsde: the uncertain volatility model

Dynamic Programming Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Homogenization and Asymptotics for Small Transaction Costs: The Multidimensional Case

On the Robust superhedging of measurable claims

Moral Hazard in Dynamic Risk Management