E
Edward Yang
Researcher at Stanford University
Publications - 31
Citations - 869
Edward Yang is an academic researcher from Stanford University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Varicella zoster virus & Lipid bilayer fusion. The author has an hindex of 15, co-authored 31 publications receiving 769 citations. Previous affiliations of Edward Yang include University of California, Berkeley.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Human cytomegalovirus expresses novel microRNAs during productive viral infection.
TL;DR: It is reported that human cytomegalovirus (HCMV) expresses miRNAs during its productive lytic infection of four clinically relevant human cell types: fibroblast, endothelial, epithelial and astrocyte cells, and the sequences of the miRN as expressed from the UL23 and US24 loci of the viral genome were conserved among all HCMV strains examined and in chimpanzee cytomeGalovirus.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Salmonella Small Non-Coding RNA Facilitates Bacterial Invasion and Intracellular Replication by Modulating the Expression of Virulence Factors
TL;DR: This study has shown that IsrM sRNA functions as a pathogenicity island-encoded sRNA directly involved in Salmonella pathogenesis in animals, and suggests that sRNAs may represent a distinct class of virulence factors that are important for bacterial infection in vivo.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Protecting users by confining JavaScript with COWL
Deian Stefan,Edward Yang,Petr Marchenko,Alejandro Russo,Dave Herman,Brad Karp,David Mazières +6 more
TL;DR: COWL introduces label-based mandatory access control to browsing contexts in a way that is fully backward-compatible with legacy web content and allows both the inclusion of untrusted scripts in applications and the building of mashups that combine sensitive information from multiple mutually distrusting origins, all while protecting users' privacy.
Book ChapterDOI
Eliminating Cache-Based Timing Attacks with Instruction-Based Scheduling
TL;DR: This paper implements instruction-based scheduling, a new kind of scheduler that is indifferent to timing perturbations from underlying hardware components, such as the cache, TLB, and CPU buses, and shows this scheduler is secure against cache-based internal timing attacks for applications using a single CPU.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
mXSS attacks: attacking well-secured web-applications by using innerHTML mutations
TL;DR: The work evaluates the attack surface, showcases examples of vulnerable high-profile applications, and provides a set of practicable and low-overhead solutions to defend against these kinds of attacks.