The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective

During the last years, and especially since the launch of the Lisbon agenda in 2000, the literature on the open method of coordination (OMC) has grown exponentially. Most writers explore the tentative outcomes of the method, since they lack a solid experimental background, against which to assess its actual effectiveness. Lately, however, some empirical studies have come to light. Among them, some fully discredit the OMC as a means of pursuing common policies at the EU level; while others recognise indirect effects, essentially at the national level of policy setting. On the basis of this assumption, i.e. that the OMC has only restricted direct effects in the short term and indirect effects in the medium to long term, the present article first puts forward a series of arguments against the current ‘spread’ of the OMC, and then offers some proposals on how to neutralise some of the identified shortfalls of the OMC. Despite the title of the article, the final conclusion is not for the demise of the OMC, but rather for its ‘communautarisation’. It is put forward that both the application and the effects of the OMC should be more clearly defined and better integrated with the other pre‐existing forms of cooperation, in accordance with basic requirements stemming from the Community legal order.

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Why the Open Method of Coordination Is Bad For You: A Letter to the EU

This article considers Hungary's political system from 2010 to 2014 with Fidesz in power and domestic and international actors’ responses to the challenge of populists-in-government. The article argues that domestic responses were weakened by Fidesz’ use of its supermajority for a partisan redrafting of the country's constitutional order, but also by its mainstream competitors’ failure to offer a contrasting yet positive vision for the electorate. External actors, and the European Union (EU) in particular, may therefore have emerged as the main bulwark against the effects of populists-in-government. However, the EU was relatively ill-equipped to deal with systemic violations of the common values of the Union with respect to its member states, and arguably even the available measures were not used to their full potential. The main explanation for this lies in Fidesz’ origins: rather than starting its life on the fringes of the electoral space, the party had been the major, mainstream centre-right alternati...

Populists in government? Hungary's “system of national cooperation”

How should the European Union cope with Member States that no longer respect the basic values of the Union? This article reviews the responses of the major European Union institutions to Poland and Hungary as their governments removed checks on their power, eliminated the independence of judiciaries and failed to honour their European commitments. As the article demonstrates, the responses of EU institutions have so far been ineffective in bringing these Member States back into line with European values. We examine the various proposals that have been made to do better, concluding that there is promise in some legal strategies that are available now, but have yet to be tried.

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Illiberalism within: rule of law backsliding in the EU

This paper provides a critical overview of options available to the EU to deal with the Rule of Law crisis in some of the Member States. The options it engages with were offered and discussed by a handful of the leading experts in the field and drawing on the critical EUI discussion, the first part of the paper tackles the following questions:1. Why should the EU reinforce the oversight of Member States’ Rule of Law performance?2. Are there sufficient legal bases for such oversight – should a reform of the Treaties be required?3. What kind of procedure could be designed to meet the need of such oversight?4. Which body should be entrusted with the oversight function?The second part provides a word of caution warning of the possible problems related to the EU's involvement with the constitutional core of the Member States.

Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union

Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation

Contents: 1. Introduction: The European Court of Justice as a Political Actor Elise Muir, Mark Dawson and Bruno de Witte 2. The Political Face of Judicial Activism: Europe's Law-politics Imbalance Mark Dawson 3. The Least Dangerous Branch of European Governance? The European Court of Justice Under the Checks and Balances Doctrine Marcus Horeth 4. Maybe Not Activist Enough? On the Court's Alleged Neoliberal Bias in its Recent Labor Cases Clemens Kaupa 5. The Court of Justice: A Fundamental Rights Institution Among Others Elise Muir 6. Actively Talking to Each Other: The Court and the Political Institutions Vassilis Hatzopoulos 7. The European Court of Justice in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty and Complexity Ellen Vos 8. The European Court of Justice and the Duty to Respect Sensitive National Interests Loic Azoulai 9. A Cautionary Tale: Some Insights Regarding Judicial Activism from the National Experience Maartje de Visser 10. Judicial Activism and the European Court of Justice: How Should Academics Respond? Anthony Arnull 11. The Role and Potential of Civil Society and Human Rights Organizations through Third Party Interventions Before the European Courts: The Case of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Sergio Carrera and Bilyana Petkova 12. Strategies Developed by - and Between - National Governments to Interact with the ECJ Mielle Bulterman and Corinna Wissels Index

Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice

Enhancing the effects of EC law on national labour markets: the Mangold case

The extensive row between France and the European Commission over the deportation of EU citizens of Roma origin in the summer of 2010 created a wave of media and academic attention in Europe; a problem that, according to a recent report of human rights watch, has continued over the last year. Several experts have explored the conformity of the France’s actions with European Union law. While these questions are of great practical relevance for victims and stakeholders, this series of events is particularly interesting for broader reasons. They pose a crucial question: what is the added value of European Union intervention in the field of fundamental rights? The case of the Roma addresses the age-old question of the additional value EU input in fundamental rights questions can bring in addition to the numerous other protections offered both through national constitutional frameworks and through the system of rights and remedies provided by the ECHR system.This paper argues that the Roma examples evidences important strengths and weaknesses also in the mechanisms available to enforce EU fundamental rights. In order to ensure adequate protection of non-discrimination rights in the EU, the existing system of ‘dual vigilance’ based on individual litigation at national level combined with enforcement action initiated by the Commission, needs to be complemented by an intermediate ‘collective’ level. Such a collective level of vigilance not only uses NGOs and/or equality bodies as intermediaries to enhance individual and institutional enforcement, but also entitles NGOs and/or other organizations representing collective interests to ensure collective enforcement of EU fundamental rights.

Individual, Institutional and Collective Vigilance in Protecting Fundamental Rights in the EU: Lessons from the Roma

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is a political and economic union founded on a respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, referred to hereafter as EU fundamental values. The central place of this commitment in the EU Treaties suggests a founding assumption: That the EU is a Union of states who themselves see human rights and the rule of law as irrevocable parts of their political and legal order. Reminiscent of the entry of Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government in 2000, the events of 2012 have done much to shake that assumption; questioning both how interwoven the rule of law tradition is across the present-day EU, and the role the EU ought to play in policing potential violations of fundamental rights carried out via the constitutional frameworks of its Member States. Much attention in this field, much like the focus of this paper, has been placed on events in one state in particular: Hungary.

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Elise Muir

Papers

Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation

Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice

Enhancing the effects of EC law on national labour markets: the Mangold case

Individual, Institutional and Collective Vigilance in Protecting Fundamental Rights in the EU: Lessons from the Roma

Hungary and the indirect protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law