Supply chain collaboration: Impact on collaborative advantage and firm performance

Part I. Introduction: Developing a Regional Approach to Global Security: 1. Theories and histories about the structure of contemporary international security 2. Levels: distinguishing the regional from the global 3. Security complexes: a theory of regional security Part II. Asia: 4. South Asia: inching towards internal and external transformation 5. Northeast and southeast Asian security complexes during the Cold War 6. The 1990s and beyond: an emergent east Asian complex Conclusion Part III. The Middle East and Africa: Introduction 7. The Middle East: a perennial conflict formation 8. Sub-saharan Africa: security dynamics in a setting of weak and failed states Conclusions Part IV. The Americas: 9. North America: the sole superpower and its surroundings 10. South America: an under-conflictual anomaly? Conclusion: scenarios for the RSCs of the Americas Part V. The Europes: Introduction: 11. EU-Europe: the European Union and its 'near abroad' 12. The Balkans and Turkey 13. The post-Soviet space: a regional security complex around Russia Conclusion: scenarios for the European supercomplex Part VI. Conclusions: 14. Regions and powers: summing up and looking ahead 15. Reflections on conceptualising international security.

http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/3437/1/75.pdf

Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security

Technology's contribution to economic growth and competitiveness has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent years. This book demonstrates the importance of a historical perspective in understanding the role of technological innovation in the economy. The authors examine key episodes and institutions in the development of the U.S. research system and in the development of the research systems of other industrial economies. They argue that the large potential contributions of economics to the understanding of technology and economic growth have been constrained by the narrow theoretical framework employed within neoclassical economies. A richer framework, they believe, will support a more fruitful dialogue among economists, policymakers, and managers on the organization of public and private institutions for innovation. David Mowery is Associate Professor of Business and Public Policy at the School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley. Nathan S. Rosenberg is Fairleigh Dickinson Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He is the author of Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics (CUP, 1983).

Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth.

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Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It

Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1

국제정치이론 = Theory of international politics

T h e Cold War lasted SO long and grew to be such a comfortable part of everyday life that it is now very difficult to chart a new foreign policy course for the nation. U.S. national strategy is a confusing mix of grand rhetoric, false starts, and well-advised caution. U.S. troops remain forward deployed, but in smaller numbers than they were during the Cold War. The United States intervenes often in the conflicts of others, but without a consistent rationale, without a clear sense of how to advance U.S. interests, and sometimes with unintended and expensive consequences. It is time to choose a new course. Here we advocate a foreign policy of restraint-the disengagement of America’s military forces from the rest of the world. Restraint is a modern form of isolationism: we adopt its military policy of withdrawal, but reject its traditional economic protectionism. The Cold War was worth fighting and winning. Soviet expansionism threatened vital US. interests; it seemed ready to swallow America’s allies in Europe and Asia, who were exhausted by World War I1 and racked by national selfdoubt. After victory over the monumental insanity of Nazism and Japanese militarism, the United States sought the prosperity interrupted by depression and a long war. But full enjoyment of its national wealth was postponed by the need to ward off the Soviet Union. Despite the collapse of the Soviet threat, American interests have not changed. The United States still seeks peace and prosperity. But now this preferred state is best obtained by restraining America’s great power, a power unmatched by any rival and unchallenged in any important dimension. Rather than lead a new crusade, America should absorb itself in the somewhat delayed task of addressing imperfections in its own society. The restraint we propose should not be misdescribed as a total withdrawal from the world. On the contrary, we believe in a vigorous trade with other

Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation

The end of the Cold War produced major changes in the U.S. defense sector. More than 2 million defense workers, military personnel, and civil servants have lost their jobs. Thousands of arms have left the industry. More than one hundred military bases have closed, and the production of weapons is down considerably. As signiacant as these changes are, they do not address the key issues in restructuring the post–Cold War defense sector. The Reagan-era defense buildup led contractors to invest in huge production capacity that no longer is needed. This capacity overhang includes too many open factories, each of which produces a “legacy” system that was designed for the Cold War. Many individual defense plants are also too large to produce efaciently at post–Cold War levels of demand. Until this excess capacity is eliminated, the United States will continue to spend too much on defense. The politics of jobs and congressional districts that many analysts thought governed the Cold War have triumphed in its aftermath. Today, years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not one Cold War weapon platform line has closed in the United States. 1 The same factories still produce the same aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles (or their incremental descendants). During the Cold War, the high level of perceived security threat increased U.S. policymakers’ respect for military advice on weapons procurement and research and development (R&D) decisions. The military services’ expert knowledge checked Congress’s pork barrel instincts, and failed or unneeded weapon systems were often canceled. Today, however, contractors and congres

Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry

American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not particularly fragile and do not require tremendous foresight by either governments or economic actors. We illustrate these mechanisms at work using evidence from every major oil disruption since 1973. We then identify the small subset of disruptive events that would overwhelm these adaptive mechanisms and therefore seriously harm the United States. Finally, we analyze the utility of U.S. foreign military policy tools in addressing these threats. Our findings suggest that the United States can defend its key interests in the Persian Gulf—the world's most important o...

Protecting "The Prize": Oil and the U.S. national interest

SINCE THE END of the cold war, Americans have struggled to understand the new threats and opportunities created by the changed international environment. The threat that captivated the United States for half a century—that a hostile great power would conquer most of die industrialized world—is now gone. Not only has the Soviet Union disappeared, but no new peer competitor is on the horizon. Furthermore, while the nuclear revolution does not guarantee peace, it does guarantee that great powers can no longer be conquered. What are the remaining international threats to the United States? If they are small, can the United States reduce its overseas commitments, cut its defense budget dramatically, and enjoy its enormous security and prosperity?

The effects of wars on neutral countries: Why it doesn't pay to preserve the peace

No one knows what security challenges the United States will face in the next century. To meet the challenges of the Cold War?Americas longest and most complex struggle?the United States created a set of institutions and societal relationships that let it prevail without sacrificing its way of life. As the new century approaches, those very institutions and relationships are at risk. Many now believe that because of Americas towering technological advantages, which were displayed so effectively in the 1991 confrontation with Iraq, no enemy will dare oppose U.S. forces with conventional weapons. Instead, future attacks will likely be "asymmetric," involving terrorism, sabotaging U.S. communications and financial systems, and poisoning cities' water supplies. Such assaults cannot defeat the United States but may cause panic and make appeasement tempting. The interest in asymmetric threats reflects not only an awareness of the United States' relative strength but also a recognition that victory in war can stem from the ability to surprise as well as from the exercise of power. During the Cold War, the U.S. national security system overcame many more symmetrical than asymmetrical surprises. The Soviets' first nuclear tests, the invasion of South Korea, the

Eugene Gholz

Papers

Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation

Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry

Protecting "The Prize": Oil and the U.S. national interest

The effects of wars on neutral countries: Why it doesn't pay to preserve the peace

Security Lessons from the Cold War