/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The Smart Grid, regarded as the next generation power grid, uses two-way flows of electricity and information to create a widely distributed automated energy delivery network. In this article, we survey the literature till 2011 on the enabling technologies for the Smart Grid. We explore three major systems, namely the smart infrastructure system, the smart management system, and the smart protection system. We also propose possible future directions in each system. colorred{Specifically, for the smart infrastructure system, we explore the smart energy subsystem, the smart information subsystem, and the smart communication subsystem.} For the smart management system, we explore various management objectives, such as improving energy efficiency, profiling demand, maximizing utility, reducing cost, and controlling emission. We also explore various management methods to achieve these objectives. For the smart protection system, we explore various failure protection mechanisms which improve the reliability of the Smart Grid, and explore the security and privacy issues in the Smart Grid.

/pdf/smart-grid-the-new-and-improved-power-grid-a-survey-4jypbbgv3j.pdf

Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey

Smart Grid - The New and Improved Power Grid:

Intelligent Manufacturing in the Context of Industry 4.0: A Review

Unit commitment, one of the most critical tasks in electric power system operations, faces new challenges as the supply and demand uncertainty increases dramatically due to the integration of variable generation resources such as wind power and price responsive demand. To meet these challenges, we propose a two-stage adaptive robust unit commitment model for the security constrained unit commitment problem in the presence of nodal net injection uncertainty. Compared to the conventional stochastic programming approach, the proposed model is more practical in that it only requires a deterministic uncertainty set, rather than a hard-to-obtain probability distribution on the uncertain data. The unit commitment solutions of the proposed model are robust against all possible realizations of the modeled uncertainty. We develop a practical solution methodology based on a combination of Benders decomposition type algorithm and the outer approximation technique. We present an extensive numerical study on the real-world large scale power system operated by the ISO New England. Computational results demonstrate the economic and operational advantages of our model over the traditional reserve adjustment approach.

/pdf/adaptive-robust-optimization-for-the-security-constrained-vx9kggvs4i.pdf

Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Security Constrained Unit Commitment Problem

This paper discusses the pricing of marginal transmission network losses in the locational marginal pricing approach recently deployed in the ISO New England (ISO-NE) standard market design (SMD) project implemented by ALSTOM's T&D Energy Automation and Information (EAI) Business. The traditional loss model is studied and a new model is proposed. The new model achieves more defendable and predictable market-clearing results by introducing loss distribution factors to explicitly balance the consumed losses in the lossless dc power system model. The distributed market slack reference is also introduced and discussed. The LMP components produced by the two models are studied and compared under changes in slack reference. Numerical examples are presented to further compare the two models.

Marginal loss modeling in LMP calculation

The growing uncertainty associated with the increasing penetration of wind and solar power generation has presented new challenges to the operation of large-scale electric power systems. Motivated ...

https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/~xsun84/publications/MRobUC.pdf

Multistage Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Unit Commitment Problem.

Flexibility is a widely used term in planning process and real-time operation. The existing research on flexibility uses different techniques to study flexibility property from different aspects. While studying a property from various viewpoints increases the understanding on the subject, we need a consistent theoretical framework to consolidate the ideas generated in the field, compare and contrast results, and build on for future analysis. Based on the insights of the nature of flexibility, this paper proposes a unified framework for defining and measuring flexibility in power system. Under the proposed framework, we propose a flexibility metric which evaluates the largest variation range of uncertainty that the system can accommodate. Such a metric takes into account transmission network and system operations constraints, which are critical to assessing flexibility, but are often ignored in literature. A robust optimization technique is used to calculate the proposed metrics. While the illustrative example presented in this paper focuses on the flexibility in real-time system operation in the presence of wind and load uncertainty, this framework can generally be applicable to long-term studies such as system planning.

A Unified Framework for Defining and Measuring Flexibility in Power System

When participating in electricity markets, owners of battery energy storage systems must bid in such a way that their revenues will at least cover their true cost of operation. Since cycle aging of battery cells represents a substantial part of this operating cost, the cost of battery degradation must be factored in these bids. However, existing models of battery degradation either do not fit market clearing software or do not reflect the actual battery aging mechanism. In this paper we model battery cycle aging using a piecewise linear cost function, an approach that provides a close approximation of the cycle aging mechanism of electrochemical batteries and can be incorporated easily into existing market dispatch programs. By defining the marginal aging cost of each battery cycle, we can assess the actual operating profitability of batteries. A case study demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed model in maximizing the operating profit of a battery energy storage system taking part in the ISO New England energy and reserve markets.

Eugene Litvinov

Papers

Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Security Constrained Unit Commitment Problem

Marginal loss modeling in LMP calculation

Multistage Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Unit Commitment Problem.

A Unified Framework for Defining and Measuring Flexibility in Power System

Factoring the Cycle Aging Cost of Batteries Participating in Electricity Markets