Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

This paper investigates how the investment horizon of a firm's institutional shareholders impacts the market for corporate control. We find that target firms with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive an acquisition bid but get lower premiums. This effect is robust and economically significant: Targets whose shareholders hold their stocks for less four months, one standard deviation away from the average holding period of 15 months, exhibit a lower premium by 3%. In addition, we find that bidder firms with short-term shareholders experience significantly worse abnormal returns around the merger announcement, as well as higher long-run underperformance. These findings suggest that firms held by short-term investors have a weaker bargaining position in acquisitions. Weaker monitoring from short-term shareholders could allow managers to proceed with value-reducing acquisitions or to bargain for personal benefits (e.g., job security, empire building) at the expense of shareholder returns.

Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control

PART I: THE STRUCTURE OF TRADING PART II: THE BENEFITS OF TRADE PART III: SPECULATORS PART IV: LIQUIDITY SUPPLIERS PART V: ORIGINS OF LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY PART VI: EVALUATION AND PREDICTION PART VII: MARKET STRUCTURES

Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners

In this paper, we extend the work of Ang et al. [J. Finance 55 (1999) 81] to large firms. We find that managerial ownership is positively related to asset utilization but does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Outside block ownership may only have a limited effect on reducing agency costs. Furthermore, smaller boards serve the same role, but independent outsiders on a board do not appear to protect the firm from agency costs. Thus, this paper reports complementary evidence to Ang, Cole and Lin. In large publicly traded corporations, managerial ownership significantly alleviates principal–agent conflicts even in the presence of other agency deterrent mechanisms.

Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms

/pdf/sovereign-cds-and-bond-pricing-dynamics-in-emerging-markets-3z9oo7z5u8.pdf

Sovereign CDS and bond pricing dynamics in emerging markets: Does the cheapest-to-deliver option matter?

In this study, we explore the dynamics of the relation between institutional trading and stock returns. We find that stock returns Granger-cause institutional trading (especially purchases) on a quarterly basis. The robust and significant causality from equity returns to institutional trading can be largely explained by the time-series variation of market returns, that is, institutions buy more popular stocks after market rises. Stock returns appear to be negatively related to lagged institutional trading. An analysis of the behavior of trading and the returns of the traded stocks reveals evidence that stocks with heavy institutional buying (selling) experience positive (negative) excess returns over the previous 12 months.

/pdf/institutional-trading-and-stock-returns-4z0ibvxpai.pdf

Institutional Trading and Stock Returns

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016091pap.pdf

Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence from the corporate bond market

http://www.martinsewell.com/causality/CaZh03.pdf

Institutional trading and stock returns

It is an established fact that investors favor the familiar%u2014be it domestic securities or, within a country, the securities of nearby firms%u2014and avoid investments that would provide the greatest diversification benefits. While we do not rule out familiarity as an important driver of portfolio allocations, we provide new evidence of investors%u2019 international diversification motive. In particular, our analysis of the security-level U.S. equity holdings of foreign and domestic institutional investors indicates that institutional investors reveal a preference for domestic multinationals (MNCs), even after controlling for familiarity factors. We attribute this revealed preference to the desire to obtain %u201Csafe%u201D international diversification. We then show that holdings of domestic MNCs are substantial and, after accounting for this home-grown foreign exposure, that the share of %u201Cforeign%u201D equities in investors%u2019 portfolios roughly doubles, reducing (but not eliminating) the observed home bias.

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w12220/w12220.pdf

Fang Cai

Papers

Sovereign CDS and bond pricing dynamics in emerging markets: Does the cheapest-to-deliver option matter?

Institutional Trading and Stock Returns

Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence from the corporate bond market

Institutional trading and stock returns

International Diversification at Home and Abroad