Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

Anatomy of a liquidity crisis: Corporate bonds in the COVID-19 crisis

We evaluate the influence of the pandemic on global bank lending and identify bank and country characteristics that amplify or weaken the effect of the disease outbreak on bank credit. Using a sample of banks from 125 countries, we apply a difference-in-difference methodology and find that bank lending is weaker in countries that are more affected by the health crisis. This effect depends on the bank's financial conditions, market structure, regulatory and institutional environment, financial intermediary and debt market development, ease of access of corporate firms to debt capital, and the response of the public health sector to the crisis.

The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Bank Lending Around the World

From COVID-19 herd immunity to investor herding in international stock markets: The role of government and regulatory restrictions

This paper explores dynamic liquidity management by 578 open-end corporate bond funds during the period from 2002 to 2014. We find that during tranquil markets, managers of corporate bond funds tend to reduce their holdings of liquid assets such as cash and government bonds to meet investor redemptions, engaging in a “horizontal cut” of their asset allocations along the liquidity spectrum. During periods with heightened macroeconomic uncertainty, however, managers tend to liquidate relatively proportionally across asset classes, pursuing a “vertical cut” and maintaining portfolio liquidity. Consistent with the existence of a target ratio of liquid assets, we find that managers tend to sell illiquid assets to restore their holdings of liquid assets subsequent to investor redemptions, especially amid elevated macroeconomic uncertainty. Turning to individual securities, we find that when liquidating corporate bonds to meet redemptions, managers tend to follow a “liquidity pecking order,” selling relatively liquid corporate bonds first, which could mitigate immediate asset liquidation costs. The micro-level liquidity management practices of corporate bond funds have implications for financial stability of broad markets.

Dynamic Liquidity Management by Corporate Bond Mutual Funds

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016091pap.pdf

Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence from the corporate bond market

Does Mutual Fund Illiquidity Introduce Fragility into Asset Prices? Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market

Liquidity restrictions on investors, like the redemption gates and liquidity fees introduced in the 2016 money market fund (MMF) reform, are meant to improve financial stability. However, we find evidence that such liquidity restrictions exacerbated the run on prime MMFs during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results indicate that gates and fees could generate strategic complementarities among investors in crisis times. Severe outflows from prime MMFs led the Federal Reserve to intervene with the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF). Using MMLF micro-data, we show how the provision of "liquidity of last resort" stabilized prime funds.

Liquidity Restrictions, Runs, and Central Bank Interventions: Evidence from Money Market Funds

Against the backdrop of COVID-19, we study how the interactions of mutual funds and dealers introduce fragility to the municipal bond market and carry lasting impacts. During the crisis, trading activities surge while dealers' liquidity provision plunges for mutual-fund-held bonds, leading to greater price depressions in these bonds. Importantly, the crisis reshapes the market's perceptions of mutual fund fragility risks. In the aftermath, yield spreads widen significantly more for bonds with greater mutual fund exposures. Such post-crisis pricing effects reflect dealers' continued reluctance to provide liquidity for mutual-fund-held bonds and they are stronger for bonds whose mutual fund holders are more susceptible to investor runs.

Mutual Fund Fragility, Dealer Liquidity Provisions, and the Pricing of Municipal Bonds

Liquidity restrictions on investors, like the redemption gates and liquidity fees introduced in the 2016 money market fund (MMF) reform, are meant to improve financial stability. However, we find evidence that such liquidity restrictions exacerbated the run on prime MMFs during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results indicate that gates and fees could generate strategic complementarities among investors in crisis times. Severe outflows from prime MMFs led the Federal Reserve to intervene with the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF). Using MMLF microdata, we show how the provision of "liquidity of last resort"" stabilized prime funds."

Yi Li

Papers

Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence from the corporate bond market

Does Mutual Fund Illiquidity Introduce Fragility into Asset Prices? Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market

Liquidity Restrictions, Runs, and Central Bank Interventions: Evidence from Money Market Funds

Mutual Fund Fragility, Dealer Liquidity Provisions, and the Pricing of Municipal Bonds

Liquidity Restrictions, Runs, and Central Bank Interventions: Evidence from Money Market Funds