G
Geoffrey Tate
Researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research
Publications - 36
Citations - 12474
Geoffrey Tate is an academic researcher from National Bureau of Economic Research. The author has contributed to research in topics: Overconfidence effect & External financing. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 35 publications receiving 10771 citations. Previous affiliations of Geoffrey Tate include University of Pennsylvania & University of California, Los Angeles.
Papers
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CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
Ulrike Malmendier,Geoffrey Tate +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions and find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.
Journal ArticleDOI
Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction
Ulrike Malmendier,Geoffrey Tate +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the impact of CEO overconfidence on mergers and acquisitions and found that overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns, both in their current firm and in potential takeover targets.
Posted Content
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
Ulrike Malmendier,Geoffrey Tate +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions and find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.
Journal ArticleDOI
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions and find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.
Posted Content
Overconfidence and Early-life Experiences: The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies
TL;DR: This article found that managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity, and use less external finance and, conditional on accessing risky capital, issue less equity than their peers.