2 1 The innovative transport systems and the CityMobil project 10 1.1 The research questions 10 2 The state of art in the field of automatic transport systems 12 2.1 Case studies and demand studies for innovative transport systems 12 3 The design and implementation of surveys 14 3.1 Definition of experimental design 14 3.2 Questionnaire design and delivery 16 3.3 First analyses on the collected sample 18 4 Calibration of Logit Multionomial demand models 21 4.1 Methodology 21 4.2 Calibration of the “full” model. 22 4.3 Calibration of the “final” model 24 4.4 The demand analysis through the final Multinomial Logit model 25 5 The analysis of interaction between the demand and socioeconomic attributes 31 5.1 Methodology 31 5.2 Application of Mixed Logit models to the demand 31 5.3 Analysis of the interactions between demand and socioeconomic attributes through Mixed Logit models 32 5.4 Mixed Logit model and interaction between age and the demand for the CTS 38 5.5 Demand analysis with Mixed Logit model 39 6 Final analyses and conclusions 45 6.1 Comparison between the results of the analyses 45 6.2 Conclusions 48 6.3 Answers to the research questions and future developments 52

The European commission

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

/pdf/incentives-and-prosocial-behavior-tzz3wh6cov.pdf

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this "overjustification effect" can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.

/pdf/incentives-and-prosocial-behavior-1fmfrk0247.pdf

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency. Matching economizes on the need for high-powered incentives. It can also, however, entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations. The framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition, incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits, and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for-profit sector and the mission-oriented sector through occupational choice. (JEL D23, D73, H41, L31) The late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism, with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods. Moreover, this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms. When it comes to the provision of collective goods, no such consensus has emerged.' Debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate. This paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods. It focuses on two key issues: how to structure incentives, and the role of competition between providers. At its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission.2 Thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission-oriented.

/pdf/competition-and-incentives-with-motivated-agents-x931r05hsc.pdf

Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents

This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation in which firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. Monopoly power is a scarce resource to be allocated across innovators who arrive at various times. The optimal assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future innovators. The resulting mechanism resembles a menu of patents that have infinite duration and fixed scope. This optimal patent menu can be implemented with a simple buyout scheme: The innovator commits at the outset to a price ceiling at which he will sell his rights to a future inventor. When a larger fee is paid initially, a higher price ceiling is obtained. Any subsequent innovator must pay this price and purchase his own buyout fee contract. We relate this mechanism to the proposed compulsory licensing schemes.

/pdf/rewarding-sequential-innovators-prizes-patents-and-buyouts-3r0imn5d98.pdf

Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts

In this paper we study the determinants of banks' decision to adopt a transactional web-site for their customers Using a panel of commercial banks in the United States for the period 2003-2006, we show that although bank-specific characteristics are important determinants of banks' adoption decisions, competition also plays a prominent role The extent of competition is related to the geographical overlap of banks in different markets and their relative market share in terms of deposits In particular, banks adopt earlier in markets where their competitors have already adopted In order to construct the different local markets, this paper is one of the first that makes use of the geographic market definitions delimited by the Cassidi R Database compiled at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis

/pdf/strategic-online-banking-adoption-3b507ly1bu.pdf

Strategic Online-Banking Adoption

This paper analyzes the interplay between firms’ self-regulation (often denoted as corporate social responsability) as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market (conscious consumers that take into account the external eects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an ineciently high externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less ecient) goods.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=1003295

Regulation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Activism

This article proposes a novel approach to assess the dynamic effect that advertising expenditures have on which products consumers include in their choice sets In a discrete-choice model, consumers face choice sets that evolve according to their awareness of each product Advertising expenditures have a dynamic effect in the sense that they raise consumer awareness of a product, increasing present and future sales To estimate this effect, the authors explicitly model the firms' dynamic advertising decisions and illustrate the model using data from the Spanish automobile market The results show that the effect of advertising on awareness is dynamic and that accounting for it is crucial in explaining the evolution of product sales over its life cycle Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that the awareness process can be significantly sped up by advertising Thus, there is a great heterogeneity in the length of the awareness process among products, depending on the level of advertising expenditu

/pdf/advertising-and-consumer-awareness-of-new-differentiated-40vuo4bigb.pdf

Advertising and Consumer Awareness of New, Differentiated Products

We analyze the optimal licensing contract that a patentee provides for a cost reducing innovation to a set of firms competing in a downstream market. We study two alternative licensing regimes: (i) a combination of royalties on sales and flat fees and (ii) fixed fees only. The first contract depends on the degree of competition in the final good market: when competition is stronger, the patentee demands a higher royalty. We also show that, contrary to the literature, using fixed fees only is not optimal for the patentee when firms are heterogeneous or when there is product differentiation. The reason is that royalties allow the patent holder to soften competition in the final good market. Finally we show that even though a combination of royalties and fees allows for improved access to the technology, social welfare is lower compared with using fixed fees only.

/pdf/patent-licensing-revisited-heterogeneous-firms-and-product-30oldip9ln.pdf

Gerard Llobet

Papers

Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts

Strategic Online-Banking Adoption

Regulation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Activism

Advertising and Consumer Awareness of New, Differentiated Products

Patent Licensing Revisited: Heterogeneous Firms and Product Differentiation