In Aristotle's teleological view of the world, natural things come to be and are present for the sake of some function or end (for example, wings are present in birds for the sake of flying). Whereas much of recent scholarship has focused on uncovering the (meta-)physical underpinnings of Aristotle's teleology and its contrasts with his notions of chance and necessity, this book examines Aristotle's use of the theory of natural teleology in producing explanations of natural phenomena. Close analyses of Aristotle's natural treatises and his Posterior Analytics show what methods are used for the discovery of functions or ends that figure in teleological explanations, how these explanations are structured, and how well they work in making sense of phenomena. The book will be valuable for all who are interested in Aristotle's natural science, his philosophy of science, and his biology.

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Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature

What has traditionally been labelled ‘Aristotle's theory of causes’ would be more intelligible if construed as ‘Aristotle's theory of explanations’, where the term ‘explanation’ has substantially the sense of Hempel and Oppenheim, who construe explanations as deductions. For Aristotle, specifying ‘causes’ is constructing demonstrations.

Aristotle's Four Becauses

A step by step, passage by passage analysis of the complete Republic. White shows how the argument of the book is articulated, the important interconnections among its elements, and the coherent and carefully developed train of though which motivates its complex philosophical reasoning. In his extensive introduction, White describes Plato's aims, introduces the argument, and discusses the major philosophical and ethical theories embodied in the Republic. He then summarizes each of its ten books and provides substantial explanatory and interpretive notes.

A Companion to Plato's Republic

Chapter 1 Preface Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 Theories of Justice Chapter 4 The Origin of the City Chapter 5 Education of the Guardians Chapter 6 The Rationally Self-Controlled City Chapter 7 The Three Waves Chapter 8 The Sun, Line, and Cave Chapter 9 Philosopher-Rulers Chapter 10 Decline and Fall Chapter 11 The Superiority of Justice Chapter 12 Art and Death Chapter 13 The Limits of the Timaeus Chapter 14 Conclusion Chapter 15 Bibliography Chapter 16 Index Chapter 17 About the Author

The transformation of Plato's Republic

de Anima III. 10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia ("imagination") on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis, I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, arguing that its account of akrasia as involving ignorance is compatible with, and in fact crucially supplements, the more straightforward account we find elsewhere in the corpus of akrasia as a struggle between desires.

https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/agph.2009.91.issue-2/agph.2009.06/agph.2009.06.xml

Akrasia and perceptual illusion

In his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics John Burnet added two appendices as particularly relevant to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia (weakness). The first appendix, De Anima, III, 10, contains Aristotle's discussion of how practical reason and want combine to cause movement for the sake of something and how explanations of action can be constructed in terms of these two elements; in the other appendix, De Motu 7, Aristotle casts explanations of actions in the form of practical inferences. The relevance of these passages to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia is beyond dispute: Aristotle explicitly employs practical inferences to represent the motivations of the akrates (weak man), and he clearly regards the behavior of the akrates as a case of movement for the sake of something, a case of action. Burnet's appendices suggest what seems to me the only sound strategy for unraveling and understanding Aristotle's explanation of akrasia. We must place this explanation within Aristotle's general theory of the explanation of action and the role of practical inference in such explanation. Akrasia is a difficult case with problems peculiar to it, but all the same it is a case of movement for the sake of something, and in explaining it Aristotle follows his paradigm of the explanation of action. In this paper I wish to take full advantage of this strategy in an attempt to reconstruct in detail and take a fresh look at Aristotle's account of akrasia. The dividends of this strategy will show themselves, I hope, as I try along the way to resolve some of the textual and philosophical difficulties in Aristotle's account, difficulties traditionally and recently raised by commentators.'

Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia

The article discusses two puzzles about Plato's account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato's assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato's criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person's way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational.

Plato's Criticism of the ``Democratic Man'' in the Republic

Plato's antidemocratic theory of social justice is instructive once we distinguish between the abstract parts of his theory and the empirical or other assumptions he uses in applying that theory. His application may have contained empirical mistakes, and it may have been burdened too much with a prolific metaphysics and a demanding epistemology. An attempt is made to look at his theory of social justice in imaginary isolation from empirical mistakes and from his metaphysics and epistemology. It is then argued that some of Plato's proposals and criticisms of democracy are well worth our attention, especially in the case of governing. His attempt to separate ruling and wealth and to establish economic floors and ceilings for his ideal city seems especially instructive in view of problems in these areas that modern democracies have experienced. Isolating his theory of social justice from his epistemology and metaphysics may be more problematic. Still, Plato's insistence that superior wisdom is the central virtue of rulers is instructive, and in this respect some modern defenders of democratic justice, such as J. S. Mill and John Rawls, have leaned some in Plato's direction. Finally, Plato's criticism of democratic free choice of occupation is less persuasive.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0265052507070173

Plato's Criticisms of Democracy in the Republic

The structure of Aristotle's ethical theory: Is it teleological or a virtue ethics?

(1989). ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S FORM OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITHOUT METAPHYSICS? Philosophical Papers: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 137-160.

Gerasimos Santas

Papers

Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia

Plato's Criticism of the ``Democratic Man'' in the Republic

Plato's Criticisms of Democracy in the Republic

The structure of Aristotle's ethical theory: Is it teleological or a virtue ethics?

Aristotle's criticism of plato's form of the good: ethics without metaphysics?