Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research

▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives, many observers expected government control of effective economic policies to induce clear economic-outcome cycles that track the electoral calendar in timing and incumbent partisanship in character. Empirics, however, typically revealed stronger evidence of partisan than of electoral shifts in real economic performance and stronger and more persistent electoral and partisan shifts in certain fiscal, monetary, and other policies than in real outcomes. Later political-economic general-equilibrium approaches incorporated rational expectations into citizens' and policy makers' economic and political behavior to explain much of this empirical pattern, yet critical anomalies and insufficiencies remain. Moreover, until recently, both rational- and adaptive-expectations electoral-and-partisan-cycle work underemphasized crucial variation...

Electoral and partisan cycles in economic policies and outcomes

We analyze a nonlinear discrete-time Cournot duopoly game, where players have heterogeneous expectations. Two types of players are considered: boundedly rational and naive expectations. In this study we show that the dynamics of the duopoly game with players whose beliefs are heterogeneous, may become complicated. The model gives more complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a consequence of increasing the speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player. The equilibrium points and local stability of the duopoly game are investigated. As some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the Nash equilibrium point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. Numerical simulations are presented to show that players with heterogeneous beliefs make the duopoly game behave chaotically. Also, we get the fractal dimension of the chaotic attractor of our map which is equivalent to the dimension of Henon map.

Nonlinear dynamics in the Cournot duopoly game with heterogeneous players

Chaotic dynamics in nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players

A review of the economics of parking

Stability, chaos and multiple attractors: A single agent makes a difference

Chaos occurs in a nonlinear cobweb model with normal demand and supply, naive expectations and adaptive production adjustment. The model differs from existing ones in that it includes adaptive production adjustment instead of adaptive expectations. The model exhibits observable chaos (strange attractors) as well as topological chaos (horseshoes) associated with homoclinic points. As numerical simulations show, the faster suppliers adjust their production and the more inelastic demand is, the more likely the market behaves chaotically.

Complex dynamics in a cobweb model with adaptive production adjustment

A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles

This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.

Gernot Sieg

Papers

Stability, chaos and multiple attractors: A single agent makes a difference

Complex dynamics in a cobweb model with adaptive production adjustment

A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles

Non-aviation revenues and their implications for airport regulation

A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents