American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/9477.pdf

Toward a theory of sustainable entrepreneurship: Reducing environmental degradation through entrepreneurial action

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law — the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, selfreporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.

/pdf/the-economic-theory-of-public-enforcement-of-law-417i69nrgj.pdf

The economic theory of public enforcement of law

I develop a corporate governance framework, provide a broad overview of recent corporate governance research, and place each of the Special Issue papers within the context of this framework The papers in the issue contribute to our understanding of a wide range of governance topics including: the role of antitakeover measures, board structure, capital market governance, compensation and incentives, debt and agency costs, director and officer labor markets, fraud, lawsuits, ownership structure, and regulation In short, the papers span almost every aspect of governance systems

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID900625_code221791.pdf?abstractid=855444&mirid=1

Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview

A club is a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits. When production costs are shared and the good is purely private, a private good club is being analyzed (McGuire 1972; Wiseman 1957). If membership characteristics differ and motivate sharing, then membership fees will differ among members (DeSerpa 1977; Scotchmer 1994b; Scotchmer and Wooders 1987). Such fees are nonanonymous , inasmuch as a fee structure is related to the identity and attributes of a member. The focus of our analysis is the sharing of an excludable (rivalrous) public good, which we term a club good . Unless otherwise specified, crowding is assumed to be independent of the individual and hence anonymous. A number of aspects of the club definition deserve highlighting. Privately owned and operated clubs must be voluntary; members choose to belong because they anticipate a net benefit from membership. Thus, the utility jointly derived from membership and from the consumption of other goods must exceed the utility associated with nonmembership status. Furthermore, the net gain in utility from membership must exceed or equal membership fees or toll payments. This voluntarism serves as the first characteristic by which to distinguish between pure public goods and club goods. In the case of a pure public good, voluntarism may be absent, since the good might harm some recipients (e.g., defense to a pacifist, fluoridation to someone who opposes its use).

The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Homogeneous clubs and local public goods

Volume 1 The history and methodology of law and economics. Volume 2 Civil law and economics. Volume 3 The regulation of contracts. Volume 4 The economics of public and tax law. Volume 5 The economics of crime and criminal litigation.

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer can reduce the probability of the accident, the magnitude of the harm, or both. Different legal solutions to the problem are examined: punitive damages, average compensation, undercompensation, accurate compensation, and negligence. We find that when the injurer can only reduce the probability of the accident, negligence with average compensation is the best solution, but negligence with perfectly compensatory damages is the desirable solution if the injurer can only or also affect the magnitude of the harm.

Judgment proofness under four different precaution technologies

Civil procedure - general, Bruce H. Kobayashi and Jeffrey S. Parker judicial organization and administration, Lewis A. Kornhauser appeal and supreme courts, Lewis A. Kornhauser indemnity of legal fees, Avery Wiener Katz settlement, Andrew F. Daughety arbitration, Bruce L. Benson class actions - representative proceedings, Charles Silver criminal procedure, Peter Lewisch bankruptcy proceedings, Franciso Cabrillo and Ben W.F. Depoorter evidence, Jeffrey S. Parker and Bruce H. Kobayashi public enforcement of law, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell economics of criminal behaviour, Erling Eide alternative sanctions (includes collateral penalties, cruel sanctions, capital punishment) alternative sanctions, cruel sanctions the economics of prisons, Kenneth L. Avio organized crime and illegal markets, Gianluca Fiorentini corruption, Roger Bowles corporate criminal liability, John R. Lott, Jr. general characteristics of rules, Louis Kaplow constitutional law, Stefan Voigt judge made law, Paul H. Rubin production of legal rules by agencies and bureaucracies, Georg von Wangenheim self-regulation, Anthony Ogus spontaneous emergence of law - customary law, Francesco Parisi conflict of laws and choice of law, Erin Ann O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein federalism, Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld international organization, Alexander Thompson and Duncan Snidal.

The economics of crime and litigation

https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/7388/04-27.pdf;sequence=2

When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution

Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. This is possible because, when parties comply, the punishment is not applied and can thus be used to support a new threat. We refer to this feature of sticks as the "multiplication effect". The same is not possible with promises to reward, since carrots are used up every time a party complies; hence, at each round a new reward is needed. We show that the multiplication effect of sticks has pervasive consequences in economics and law, and provides a unified explanation for seemingly unrelated phenomena such as comparative negligence, legal aid, the dynamics of riots and revolutions, the use of property rules, the commons problem, and the most-favorednation clause in settlement negotiations.

/pdf/carrots-sticks-and-the-multiplication-effect-8uu0c715jh.pdf

Gerrit De Geest

Papers

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Judgment proofness under four different precaution technologies

The economics of crime and litigation

When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution

Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect