American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag - ers are privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multi- divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self-interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk. The only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights. We show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

/pdf/when-does-coordination-require-centralization-1ev7bqc76d.pdf

When Does Coordination Require Centralization

Ever since the publication in 1905 of Max Weber's study Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, there has been lively controversy concerning the connection between religious belief and economic activity. Three main .categories of opinion have emerged from this debate: (1) the theory advocated by Weber, which has found numerous supporters aware in varying degrees of their debt to Weber's mode of thought: viz., that Protestantism, especially in its Calvinistic form, created a climate in which the ‘spirit of capitalism’ could flourish; (2) what may be called the inverted Weberian theory, argued with particular rigour by H. M. Robertson, that the spirit of capitalism is not the creator but the creation of businessmen; and finally (3) an intermediate theory, presented by Professor R. H. Tawney and others, the gist of which may be said to be that economic change tan affect religious teaching, but that also religious teaching can in tum intensify and enhance the spirit of capitalism. O...

Religion and the rise of capitalism

Contents Volume IIIA: Preface. Analytical Tools. Introduction (J. Behrman, T.N. Srinivasan). Data and econometric tools for development analysis (A. Deaton). Human resources: Empirical modeling of household and family decisions (J. Strauss, D. Thomas). Applied general equilibrium models for policy analysis (J.W. Gunning, M. Keyzer). Resources, Technology, and Institutions. Introduction (J. Behrman, T.N. Srinivasan). Savings, credit and insurance (T. Besley). Technological change and technology strategy (R.E. Evenson, L.E. Westphal). Institutions and economic development (J.Y. Lin, J.B. Nugent). Poverty, institutions, and the environmental-resource base (P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler) Contents Volume IIIB: Policy Reform, Stabilization, Structural Adjustment and Growth. Introduction (J. Behrman, T.N. Srinivasan). Policy lessons from development experience since the second world war (A. Krueger). Poverty and policy (M. Lipton, M. Ravallion). Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations (H. Binswanger et al.). Human and physical infrastructure: investment and pricing policies in developing countries (E. Jiminez). Structural adjustment, stabilization and policy reform: domestic and international finance (V. Corbo, S. Fischer). Trade and industrial policy reform (D. Rodrik). The contributions of endogenous growth theory to the analysis of development problems: an assessment (P. Bardhan).

/pdf/handbook-of-development-economics-16bnyptd1x.pdf

Handbook of development economics

The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism

There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? Is there an optimal mix of litigation and legislation? The law is inevitably subject to a certain degree of uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and, hence, prevents parties from settling disputes out of court. Conversely, the law is necessarily certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates of litigation and uncertainty in a formal model, study how they are affected by two different policies - litigation fees/subsidies and legislation - and compare the costs and benefits of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking. We then extend the analysis to explore the implications of this approach.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1290718_code410506.pdf?abstractid=869368

Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process

This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer can reduce the probability of the accident, the magnitude of the harm, or both. Different legal solutions to the problem are examined: punitive damages, average compensation, undercompensation, accurate compensation, and negligence. We find that when the injurer can only reduce the probability of the accident, negligence with average compensation is the best solution, but negligence with perfectly compensatory damages is the desirable solution if the injurer can only or also affect the magnitude of the harm.

Judgment proofness under four different precaution technologies

There is extensive literature on whether courts or legislators produce efficient rules, but which of them produces rules efficiently? The law is subject to uncertainty ex ante; uncertainty makes the outcomes of trials difficult to predict and deters parties from settling disputes out of court. In contrast, the law is certain ex post: litigation fosters the creation of precedents that reduce uncertainty. We postulate that there is a natural balance between the degree of uncertainty of a legal system (kept under control by litigation) and its litigation rate (sustained by uncertainty). We describe such equilibrium rates in a model of tort litigation, study how they are affected by different policies, and compare the costs and benefits of the legislative and the judicial process of lawmaking.

/pdf/uncertainty-of-law-and-the-legal-process-3ewrukf6pj.pdf

Uncertainty of law and the legal process

https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/7388/04-27.pdf;sequence=2

When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution

Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. This is possible because, when parties comply, the punishment is not applied and can thus be used to support a new threat. We refer to this feature of sticks as the "multiplication effect". The same is not possible with promises to reward, since carrots are used up every time a party complies; hence, at each round a new reward is needed. We show that the multiplication effect of sticks has pervasive consequences in economics and law, and provides a unified explanation for seemingly unrelated phenomena such as comparative negligence, legal aid, the dynamics of riots and revolutions, the use of property rules, the commons problem, and the most-favorednation clause in settlement negotiations.

/pdf/carrots-sticks-and-the-multiplication-effect-8uu0c715jh.pdf

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Papers

Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process

Judgment proofness under four different precaution technologies

Uncertainty of law and the legal process

When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution

Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect