I offer an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility consisting of a series of propositions specifying the conditions under which corporations are likely to behave in socially responsible ways. I argue that the relationship between basic economic conditions and corporate behavior is mediated by several institutional conditions: public and private regulation, the presence of nongovernmental and other independent organizations that monitor corporate behavior, institutionalized norms regarding appropriate corporate behavior, associative behavior among corporations themselves, and organized dialogues among corporations and their stakeholders. Concerns about corporate social responsibility have grown significantly during the last two decades. Not only has the issue become commonplace in the business press and among business and political leaders (Buhr & Graf

http://laisumedu.org/DESIN_Ibarra/desin/imagenescampbell/tres-c.pdf

Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility

With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...

/pdf/collective-action-and-the-evolution-of-social-norms-39il4hoxmh.pdf

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation

The wealth of networks : how social production transformsmarkets and freedom

Using various methods, the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, transition, and OECD countries is estimated. Average size varies from 12 percent of GDP for OECD countries, to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries. Increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy, especially in OECD countries. According to some findings, corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy, and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official GDP growth.

/pdf/shadow-economies-size-causes-and-consequences-1rnohp2zuz.pdf

Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences

/pdf/governing-the-commons-the-evolution-of-institutions-for-39v8jch1o6.pdf

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Cognitive dissonance is defined as the psychological discomfort or annoyance that may exist when an individual's choice is not consistent with his values and beliefs. Dissonance may cause an individual to reconsider his values and beliefs, enter new choices with different parameters, respond to the constraints imposed, or change his individual preference function. This paper extends Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance to the work of public choice theorists and seeks to explain the incentives of the iron triangle to foment and quell dissonance. Examples are provided for specific environmental and health and safety risks.

The political economy of dissonance

We assessed the sustainability of fiscal policy in the 28 European Union countries over the 1980-2015 years. Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-sectional dependence showed that government revenues, expenditures, the primary balance, and debt were non-stationary series. However, cointegration tests reveled that a long-run relationship exists between government revenues and expenditures as well as between government primary deficit and debt. The results of causality tests were in line with the neutrality hypothesis: government revenues do not cause the expenditures, and vice versa. Furthermore, mixture models analyses indicated the presence of three homogeneous clusters, one of which included Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS), whose coefficient of 0.68 indicates the absence of sustainability, since government expenditures grow faster than revenues.

Fiscal Sustainability in the EU

We analyze the sustainability of fiscal policy in a panel framework for the G-7 countries in the 1980–2015 years. Panel unit root tests show that government expenditures, revenues, debt and primary deficit are non-stationary. However, a clear cointegrating relationship is found between government debt and primary deficit. Therefore, these countries should pay attention to the equilibrium between expenditure and revenues, as possible source of fiscal insolvency. Finally, a bi-directional causality flow emerges both between government revenues and expenditures as well as between government primary deficit and debt. Thus, the decisions governing expenditures and taxes are jointly made in G-7 countries.

A panel data analysis of the fiscal sustainability of G-7 countries

We investigate the sustainability of fiscal policy in a set of 19 European Monetary Union (EMU) countries over the period 1970–2016. Panel unit root tests in the presence of cross-section dependence show that the Government debt series is stationary, indicating that the solvency condition would be satisfied for the EMU-19 countries. This implies the effectiveness of the austerity measures implemented by member countries. Moreover, Markov-switching models estimates show that for 12 selected countries two different regimes exist, with statistically different coefficients across states. For all these countries, the mean of government debt in the more recent years (state 2) is incredibly higher than the mean of the 1970s (state 1).

Gordon L. Brady

Papers

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

The political economy of dissonance

Fiscal Sustainability in the EU

A panel data analysis of the fiscal sustainability of G-7 countries

Government Debt in EMU Countries