Volume 32
Issue 2
Spring 1992
Spring 1992
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action Collective Action
Elinor Ostrom
Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Elinor Ostrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
, 32 Nat.
Resources J. 415 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol32/iss2/6
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been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For
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GOVERNING
THE
COMMONS:
The
Evolution
of
Institutions
for
Collective
Action
Elinor Ostrom
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1990.
Pp.
280.
In
1985,
the
National Academy
of
Sciences sponsored
a
conference
in
Annapolis,
Maryland,
to
discuss
common
property resource
management.
This
conference
was
a
watershed
in
the
development
of
the
theoretical
underpinning
of
institutional design
for
successful
common
pool
resource
(CPR)
management.
Since then,
an
international network
of
over
2,000
researchers
has
developed,
and
the
International
Association
for
the
Study
of
Common
Property
(IASCP),
formed
in
1989,
has held
two successful
international conferences. Dominating
the
intellectual
evolution
of
the
field
has been the work
of
Elinor
Ostrom,
co-director
of
the
Workshop
in
Political Theory
and
Policy
Analysis
at
Indiana
University. Her
book,
Governing
the Commons,
presents
a
lucid
exposition
of
the
current
state
of
institutional
analysis
of
common
property
problems.
Part
of
the
Cam-
bridge
series
on
Political
Economy
of
Institutions
and
Decisions,
the
book
addresses
how
common
pool
resources
may
be
managed successfully
without
falling prey
to
the
"tragedy
of
the
commons."
Common
pool
resources
are
characterized
by
subtractability
(i.e.,
with-
drawal
by
one
user
reduces
the
amount
of
the
resource
left
for
other
users)
and
joint
use by
a
group
of
appropriators.
Thus,
a
common
village grazing
field
has forage
for
a
limited
number
of
beasts,
and
all
the
villagers are
entitled
to
pasture
their animals
on
the
field.
Community
rules
of
access
and
management
are
required
to
sustain the
field
from
season
to
season.
Problems
in
managing
CPRs
arise
when
the rational
individual
determines
that
he
will still
have
access
to
the
resource
even
if
he
does not
fully
contribute
to
its
maintenance
(the
"free
rider"
problem).
An
extensive
literature discusses
the effect
of
free
riders,
concluding
that
common
pool
resources
will
inevitably
fall
into
ruin. One
of
two
solutions
is
usually
offered
to
avoid this
problem:
centralized governmental regulation
or
privatization.
Noting the numerous occasions
in
which
common
pool
resources are
managed
successfully
with
neither centralized
governmental control
nor
privatization,
Ostrom
argues
for
a
third
approach
to resolving
the
problem
of
the commons:
the
design
of
durable cooperative
institutions
that are
organized
and
governed
by
the
resource
users.
In
Governing
the
Commons
she examines small-scale
common-pool
resources.
Resource
user
groups
examined
range
in
size from
50-15,000
people
who rely
substantially
on
the
common
pool resource
for
their
economic
well-being.
She has
further
NATURAL
RESOURCES
JOURNAL
limited
the
sample
by
excluding
non-renewable
resources,
resources
that
are
abundant
(rather
than scarce),
and
situations
which
produce
substantial
externalities.
These
selection
criteria
have
been
chosen
for
several
reasons.
First,
the
relatively
small
size
of
the
user
groups enables researchers
to
inves-
tigate
the
existing
institutions
thoroughly.
Second, resource
scarcity
means
the
users
will
have
strong
incentives
to
manage
their resources
in
a
sustainable
fashion.
And finally,
economic
dependence
guarantees
that
any
failures
of
the resource
appropriators
cannot
be
attributed
to
economic
indifference.
Two
sets
of
cases
of
successful
CPR
management
are
examined
in
detail:
communal
tenure
in
high
mountain
meadows
and
forests
in
Swit-
zerland
and
Japan, and irrigation
systems
in
Spain
and
the
Philippines.
From
these cases,
Ostrom
identifies
eight similar
design
principles.
The
first
principle
is
demarcation
of
clearly
defined
boundaries
to
iden-
tify
the
members
of
the
user
pool
as
well as
the
physical
boundaries
of
the
CPR.
The
second, congruence
between
appropriation
and
provision
rules
and
local
conditions,
requires
appropriation
rules
(regarding
the
time,
place, acceptable
technology,
and
quantity
of
CPR
allocated)
to
be
specific
to
the
characteristics
of
the
actual
resource;
similarly,
the
rules
governing
the
contribution
required
of
each
appropriator
must
mirror
local
conditions.
Third,
collective-choice arrangements
allow
participation
by
all affected
individuals
in
deciding
on the
appropriation
and
provision
rules.
Fourth,
either
the
appropriators
themselves
or
persons
accountable
to
the
appropriators
are
responsible
for
monitoring compliance
with
collec-
tive
decisions.
Fifth,
sanctions
should
be
graduated
to reflect
the
severity,
frequency,
and
context
of
the
violation.
Sixth,
low-cost
and
readily
avail-
able
conflict-resolution
mechanisms must
exist
to
mediate conflicts
among
appropriators
and
between
appropriators
and
officials.
Seventh,
users
must
have
recognition
of
their
own
rights
to
organize
institutions.
Finally,
nested
enterprises,
i.e.,
sets
of
rules
established
within
a
hi-
erarchy
of
appropriator
institutions, must
be
established
for common-pool
resources
that
are
within
larger
resource
systems
and
political
jurisdic-
tions.
To
explore
how such
principles
may
have
developed,
Ostrom
uses
a
contemporary
case,
the
development
of
negotiated
settlements
of
water
rights
in
three
southern
California
water basins.
She
concludes
that
in-
stitutional
change
is
incremental
and
sequential,
enabling
appropriators
to
realize
the
benefits
of
change before
moving
on
to
new
institutional
arrangements.
In
her
final
set
of
case
analyses,
Ostrom
examines
unsuccessful
com-
mon-pool
management
systems
in
Turkey,
California,
Sri
Lanka,
and
[Vol. 32
BOOK
REVIEWS
Nova Scotia. The
CPR
institutions
in
these
cases
do
not
evidence
the
design principles Ostrom
isolated
from
the
successful
CPR
regimes.
The
final
chapter
presents
a
"framework
for
analysis
of
self-organizing
and
self-governing CPRs." Ostrom
carefully
distinguishes the
notion
of
framework
from that
of
a
model.
Models
are
applicable
to specific
situations
and
their
variables
rest
on
assumptions
peculiar
to
the
modeled
situation.
Frameworks,
in
contrast,
relate
models to
each
other
and
provide
the
basis
for
generating
more
specific
hypotheses
and
subsequent
theories.
Ostrom's
framework
iden-
tifies
the
complex system
of
variables, rules,
and
external
constraints
that
affect
the
design
of
CPR
management
regimes.
Governing
the Commons
is
a
major
theoretical
contribution
to
the
study
of
collective
action
and
institutional design.
It
describes
in
clear
language
the
problems
arising
from
CPR
management
and
presents
an
uncompro-
mising
critique
of
existing
approaches. Based
on
empirical
evidence
gath-
ered
from
a
variety
of
sources,
Ostrom's
analytical framework
offers
opportunity
for
extensive
theoretical
development.
It is
an
inclusive
framework
which
is
not limited
to
a
few
disciplines
but
instead
solicits
contributions
from
the
entire range
of
social
sciences.
Clearly
written,
the
book
is
essential
for
understanding
common-pool resource
manage-
ment
institutions.
Susan
J.
Buck
Department
of
Political
Science
University
of
North
Carolina
at
Greensboro
Spring
19921