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Gregory DeAngelo

Researcher at Claremont Graduate University

Publications -  85
Citations -  675

Gregory DeAngelo is an academic researcher from Claremont Graduate University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Law enforcement & Public good. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 79 publications receiving 576 citations. Previous affiliations of Gregory DeAngelo include West Virginia University & Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

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Peers or Police? Detection and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use a lab experiment to compare public good contribution decisions in an environment where they relax the assumption that detection is automated and find that sanctions and the likelihood of detection share an inverse relationship.
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Pricing risk in prostitution: Evidence from online sex ads

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extracted a range of variables from more than 30 million online ads for real-world sex over four years, data significantly larger than that previously developed, and established prices in a common numeraire and study the correlates of pricing, focusing on risk.
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Theory of Mind and General Intelligence in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

TL;DR: It is found that lower social cognition is an important explanatory variable for selfish behavior in a non-strategic environment, while general intelligence shares some correlation in a strategic environment.
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Goods allocation by queuing and the occurrence of violence: A probabilistic analysis

TL;DR: In this article, the authors use the theory of discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) to construct and analyze models in which they explicitly account for queue length and the number of citizens who are not provided a good that is allocated with a queuing mechanism.
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The Price of Expungements

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a behavioral perspective and offer experimental evidence about the impact of expungements priced at different levels, showing that, from a general deterrence perspective, it is better to implement expungement at very high prices.