Showing papers by "Hans Keiding published in 2016"
TL;DR: In this article, a regulatory mechanism for the regulation of firms in the context of asymmetric information with the aim to induce firms to report its private information truthfully and to save information rents is proposed.
Abstract: This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of firms in the context of asymmetric information with the aim to induce firms to report its private information truthfully and to save information rents. Baron and Myerson (1982) have considered this problem and derived an optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. They show that it was possible to create a regulatory mechanism that induced the firm to report its private information truthfully. To secure this, a part of the mechanism is to pay the firm a subsidy. This article presents a regulatory mechanism which explores competition in the context of an industry characterized by increasing returns to scale. In contrast to the model in this article, the Baron and Myerson model doesn’t consider increasing returns to scale. In equilibrium each firm chooses to report truthfully without receiving any subsidy. However, the use of competition gives rise to an efficiency lost. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
3 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a two-period model of a three-country world with free trade in finished products and some factor mobility, where production is subject to uncertainty, is considered, and it is shown that integrating production across countries, in particular integrating economically strong and weak partners, may give rise to a welfare loss, showing that traditional views on efficiency of international trade must be reconsidered when risk and uncertainty are taken into account.
Abstract: We consider a two-period model of a three-country world with free trade in finished products and some factor mobility, where production is subject to uncertainty. Enterpreneurs may establish production in other countries but can obtain financing only in the country of origin. In this model, integrating production across countries, in particular integrating economically strong and weak partners, may give rise to a welfare loss, showing that traditional views on efficiency of international trade must be reconsidered when risk and uncertainty are taken into account.
TL;DR: A model of retrieving and processing information to be used for the study of guidelines and their use shows that in cases where there are sufficiently many decisions to be made on the basis of the information obtained, there can be no other objective ranking of methods than the trivial one ranking more information is higher than less information.
Abstract: In recent years, increased attention has been given to guidelines for cost-effectiveness analysis of medical interventions, and some of these guidelines (such as NICE [1]) have become rather influential. In the paper, we present a model of retrieving and processing information to be used for the study of guidelines and their use. Our main result, which relies on a version of the theorem of Blackwell [2], shows that in cases where there are sufficiently many decisions to be made on the basis of the information obtained, there can be no other objective ranking of methods than the trivial one ranking more information is higher than less information. In our context, this means that guidelines may have administrative advantages but cannot be considered as a scientifically based approach to better decision making.