人教版高中英语新课程教材中,语言运用（Using Language）是每个单元必不可少的部分,提供了围绕单元中心话题的听、说、读、写的综合性练习,是单元中心话题的延续和升华.如何设计Using Language部分的教学,使自己的教学模式既不落俗套,又能真正体现新课程标准所倡导的教学理念,正是广大一线英语教师一直努力探索的问题.

打磨Using Language,倡导新理念

This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

What is modal logic

Understanding how science students respond to anomalous data is essential to understanding knowledge acquisition in science classrooms. This article presents a detailed analysis of the ways in which scientists and science students respond to such data. We postulate that there are seven distinct forms of response to anomalous data, only one of which is to accept the data and change theories. The other six responses involve discounting the data in various ways in order to protect the preinstructional theory. We analyze the factors that influence which of these seven forms of response a scientist or student will choose, giving special attention to the factors that make theory change more likely. Finally, we discuss the implications of our framework for science instruction.

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The Role of Anomalous Data in Knowledge Acquisition: A Theoretical Framework and Implications for Science Instruction

Across the broad fields of educational theory and research, constructivism has become something akin to a secular religion. In her book Evolution as a Religion (1985), Mary Midgley wrote that the theory of evolution "is not just an inert piece of theoretical science. It is, and cannot help being, also a powerful folk-tale about human origins. Any such narrative must have symbolic force" (1985, p. 1). She might well have written the same about constructivism, which is, whatever else it may be, a "powerful folktale" about the origins of human knowledge. As in all living religions, constructivism has many sects-each of which harbors some distrust of its rivals. This descent into

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The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism

From the Publisher:
Belief revision is a topic of much interest in theoretical computer science and logic, and it forms a central problem in research into artificial intelligence. In simplest terms it addresses the problem of updating a database of knowledge in the light of new information and what to do in the case where new information is in conflict with something that was previously held to be true. The problem is central to the study of artificial intelligence, because an intelligent system should be able to accomodate all such cases. This book contains a collection of up-to-date research articles on belief revision and an introductory chapter that presents a survey of current research in the area and the fundamentals of the theory.

Belief Revision

0. Overview 1. Doxastic States and Their Representation 2. Epistemology and Belief Change 3. Changing Doxastic States: Two Complementary Perspectives 4. Concepts of Theoretical Rationality: Postulates for Belief Change and Nonmonotonic Reasoning 5. Foundational Belief Change Using Nonmonotonic Inference 6. A General Concept of Practical Rationality: Constraints for Coherent Choice 7. Coherentist Belief Change as a Problem of Rational Choice 8. Revealed Preferences: Understanding the Theory of Epistemic Entrenchment Appendices A B C D E References/Bibliography Index of Symbols Index of Names Subject Index

Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gardenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gardenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant construction recipes for minimal changes of belief states. These relations, however, are required to satisfy rather demanding conditions. In the present paper we liberalize the concept of epistemic entrenchment by removing connectivity, minimality and maximality conditions. Correspondingly, we achieve a liberalization of the concept of rational belief change that does no longer presuppose the postulates of success and rational monotony. We show that the central results of Gardenfors and Makinson are preserved in our more flexible setting. Moreover, the generalized concept of epistemic entrenchment turns out to be applicable also to relational and iterated belief changes.

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Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment

Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief states—methods that have usually been characterized semantically by a system-of-spheres modeling. Among the methods represented are ‘radical’, ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’ revision, ‘revision by comparison’ in its raising and lowering variants, as well as various constructions for belief expansion and contraction. Importantly, none of these methods makes any use of numbers.

https://www.uni-regensburg.de/philosophie-kunst-geschichte-gesellschaft/theoretische-philosophie/medien/texte-rott/bare-81.pdf

Shifting priorities: Simple representations for twenty-seven iterated theory change operators

The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the incorporation of new information). Makinson has generalised this work by introducing the notion of a withdrawal operation. Underlying the account proffered by AGM is the idea of rational belief change. A belief change operation should be guided by certain principles or integrity constraints in order to characterise change by a rational agent. One of the most noted principles within the context of AGM is the Principle of Informational Economy. However, adoption of this principle in its purest form has been rejected by AGM leading to a more relaxed interpretation. In this paper, we argue that this weakening of the Principle of Informational Economy suggests that it is only one of a number of principles which should be taken into account. Furthermore, this weakening points toward a Principle of Indifference. This motivates the introduction of a belief removal operation that we call severe withdrawal. We provide rationality postulates for severe withdrawal and explore its relationship with AGM contraction. Moreover, we furnish possible worlds and epistemic entrenchment semantics for severe withdrawals.

https://www.uni-regensburg.de/philosophie-kunst-geschichte-gesellschaft/theoretische-philosophie/medien/texte-rott/severe.pdf

Hans Rott

Papers

Belief Revision

Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment

Shifting priorities: Simple representations for twenty-seven iterated theory change operators

Severe withdrawal (and recovery)