http://user.it.uu.se/~jarst116/slides/week4.pdf

Graph-Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation

Knowledge representation is at the very core of a radical idea for understanding intelligence. Instead of trying to understand or build brains from the bottom up, its goal is to understand and build intelligent behavior from the top down, putting the focus on what an agent needs to know in order to behave intelligently, how this knowledge can be represented symbolically, and how automated reasoning procedures can make this knowledge available as needed. 

This landmark text takes the central concepts of knowledge representation developed over the last 50 years and illustrates them in a lucid and compelling way. Each of the various styles of representation is presented in a simple and intuitive form, and the basics of reasoning with that representation are explained in detail. This approach gives readers a solid foundation for understanding the more advanced work found in the research literature. The presentation is clear enough to be accessible to a broad audience, including researchers and practitioners in database management, information retrieval, and object-oriented systems as well as artificial intelligence. This book provides the foundation in knowledge representation and reasoning that every AI practitioner needs.

*Authors are well-recognized experts in the field who have applied the techniques to real-world problems 
* Presents the core ideas of KR&R in a simple straight forward approach, independent of the quirks of research systems 
*Offers the first true synthesis of the field in over a decade

Table of Contents

1 Introduction * 2 The Language of First-Order Logic *3 Expressing Knowledge * 4 Resolution * 5 Horn Logic * 6 Procedural Control of Reasoning * 7 Rules in Production Systems * 8 Object-Oriented Representation * 9 Structured Descriptions * 10 Inheritance * 11 Numerical Uncertainty *12 Defaults *13 Abductive Reasoning *14 Actions * 15 Planning *16 A Knowledge Representation Tradeoff * Bibliography * Index

/pdf/knowledge-representation-and-reasoning-4dos5m8edp.pdf

Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

When I started out as a newly hatched PhD student, back in the day, one of the first articles I read and understood (or at least thought that I understood) was Ray Reiter’s classic article on default logic (Reiter, 1980).This was some years after the famous ‘non-monotonic logic’ issue of Artificial Intelligence in which that article appeared, but default logic was still one of the leading approaches, a tribute to the simplicity and power of the theory. As a result of reading the article, I became fascinated by both default logic and, more generally, non-monotonic logics. However, despite my fascination, these approaches never seemed terribly useful for the kinds of problem that I was supposed to be studying—problems like those in medical decision making—and so I eventually lost interest. In fact non-monotonic logics seemed to me, and to many people at the time I think, not to be terribly useful for anything. They were interesting, and clearly relevant to the long-term goals of Artificial Intelligence as a discipline, but not of any immediate practical importance. This verdict, delivered at the end of the 1980s, continued, I think, to be true for the next few years while researchers working in non-monotonic logics studied problems that to outsiders seemed to be ever more obscure. However, by the end of the 1990s, it was becoming clear, even to folk as short-sighted as I, that non-monotonic logics were getting to the point at which they could be used to solve practical problems. Knowledge in action shows quite how far these techniques have come. The reason that non-monotonic logics were invented was, of course, in order to use logic to reason about the world. Our knowledge of the world is typically incomplete, and so, in order to reason about it, one has to make assumptions about things one does not know. This, in turn, requires mechanisms for both making assumptions and then retracting them if and when they turn out not to be true. Non-monotonic logics are intended to handle this kind of assumption making and retracting, providing a mechanism that has the clean semantics of logic, but which has a non-monotonic set of conclusions. Much of the early work on non-monotonic logics was concerned with theoretical reasoning, that is reasoning about the beliefs of an agent—what the agent believes to be true. Theoretical reasoning is the domain of all those famous examples like ‘Typically birds fly. Tweety is a bird, so does Tweety fly?’, and the fact that so much of non-monotonic reasoning seemed to focus on theoretical reasoning was why I lost interest in it. I became much more concerned with practical reasoning—that is reasoning about what an agent should do—and non-monotonic reasoning seemed to me to have nothing interesting to say about practical reasoning. Of course I was wrong. When one tries to formulate any kind of description of the world as the basis for planning, one immediately runs into applications of non-monotonic logics, for example in keeping track of the state of a changing world. It is this use of non-monotonic logic that is at the heart of Knowledge in action. Building on the McCarthy’s situation calculus, Knowledge in action constructs a theory of action that encompasses a very large part of what an agent requires to reason about the world. As Reiter says in the final chapter,

Knowledge in Action: Logical Foundations for Specifying and Implementing Dynamical Systems

Journal of the ACM

IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA) におけるフルードパワー技術の研究動向

Dynamic belief revision operators

The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the incorporation of new information). Makinson has generalised this work by introducing the notion of a withdrawal operation. Underlying the account proffered by AGM is the idea of rational belief change. A belief change operation should be guided by certain principles or integrity constraints in order to characterise change by a rational agent. One of the most noted principles within the context of AGM is the Principle of Informational Economy. However, adoption of this principle in its purest form has been rejected by AGM leading to a more relaxed interpretation. In this paper, we argue that this weakening of the Principle of Informational Economy suggests that it is only one of a number of principles which should be taken into account. Furthermore, this weakening points toward a Principle of Indifference. This motivates the introduction of a belief removal operation that we call severe withdrawal. We provide rationality postulates for severe withdrawal and explore its relationship with AGM contraction. Moreover, we furnish possible worlds and epistemic entrenchment semantics for severe withdrawals.

https://www.uni-regensburg.de/philosophie-kunst-geschichte-gesellschaft/theoretische-philosophie/medien/texte-rott/severe.pdf

Severe withdrawal (and recovery)

http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~hector/Papers/aij09.pdf

Iterated belief change in the situation calculus

John McCarthy's situation calculus has left an enduring mark on artificial intelligence research. This simple yet elegant formalism for modelling and reasoning about dynamic systems is still in common use more than forty years since it was first proposed. The ability to reason about action and change has long been considered a necessary component for any intelligent system. The situation calculus and its numerous extensions as well as the many competing proposals that it has inspired deal with this problem to some extent. In this paper, we offer a new approach to belief change associated with performing actions that addresses some of the shortcomings of these approaches. In particular, our approach is based on a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus extended to deal with belief. Moreover, by augmenting this approach with a notion of plausibility over situations, our account handles nested belief, belief introspection, mistaken belief, and handles belief revision and belief update together with iterated belief change.

Maurice Pagnucco

Papers

Dynamic belief revision operators

Severe withdrawal (and recovery)

Iterated belief change in the situation calculus

Iterated belief change in the situation calculus

Application of cognitive robotics in disassembly of products