This article explores the impact of democratic transitions in Southeast Asia on regional co-operation, and the relationship between this process and the development of a non-official regionalism. Until now, regionalism in Southeast Asia has been essentially elite-centred and politically illiberal. The emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded upon the common desire of its members, which had by then retreated significantly from their postcolonial experiments in liberal democracy, to ensure regime survival. This orientation was further institutionalised by asean 's doctrine of non-interference, which helped to shield its members from outside pressures towards democratisation. But with democratisation in the Philippines, Thailand and more recently Indonesia, the asean model of elite-centric regional socialisation has been challenged. The civil society in the region demands greater openness in Southeast Asian regionalism. The article proposes a conceptual framework for analysing the ...

Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia

The article inquires into the conditions of effective leadership of states in international politics, and develops a framework for the study of so-called (new) regional powers such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa in processes of regional institution-building. Various theoretical strands will be discussed as to the requirements of effective leadership in international affairs. Most importantly, the relationship between power, leadership and hegemony will be outlined. It is argued that the connection between leadership and hegemony is one of co-constitution. Leadership is necessarily based on hegemony, while hegemony can only be sustained through leadership. Furthermore, it will be shown that both leadership and hegemony are essentially political in character, whereas power has no such insinuation but has to be translated into leadership and hegemony through discursive means. Finally, the analysis asks for the preconditions of leadership in East Asia, using China's and Japan's roles in East Asian regionalism as an illustration.

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Power, leadership, and hegemony in international politics: the case of East Asia

This monograph examines security-related track two diplomacy efforts in the Middle East and South Asia, including how such efforts have socialized participants into thinking about security in more cooperative terms, and whether the ideas generated in track two forums have been acknowledged at the societal level or influenced official policy. Kaye concludes with suggestions on how to improve future track two efforts.

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Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia

Introduction In June 1998, against the backdrop of the Asian economic and financial crisis and serious diplomatic disagreements with neighbouring Myanmar, (1) former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan called on members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to adopt the concept of "flexible engagement" as a corporate policy. (2) "Flexible engagement" was to allow ASEAN governments to publicly comment on and collectively discuss fellow members' domestic policies when these would have cross-border implications, i.e. adversely affect the disposition of other ASEAN states. Surin Pitsuwan's bold proposal constituted a multi-pronged challenge to ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture (Haacke 1999, pp. 583-85). (3) First, "flexible engagement" appeared to challenge the principle of non-interference in the sense that agreement on the concept seemed designed to pave the way for unsolicited involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. Second, the proposal challenged the norm of quiet diplomacy because the concept was to explicitly allow for public discussion and criticism of one ASEAN country by another. And, third, by suggesting that the Association should become involved in intra-state issues if these entailed adverse consequences for other members, "flexible engagement" also challenged the long-standing norm that ASEAN should not take up collectively what for the most part would previously have been regarded as bilateral disputes. Arguably, the proposal also threatened to remove the ambiguity that until then had allowed individual member states to sometimes engage in and/or tolerate perceived instances of diplomatic interference. While noting that "flexible engagement" would indeed amount to a new departure for ASEAN, the Thai Foreign Minister was adamant at the time that "flexible engagement" was not incompatible with the principle of non-interference. Rather, it was an attempt to delimit the range of situations in which individual member states would henceforth still be justified to appeal to the norm of non-interference to ward off outside involvement in their so-called internal affairs. Notably, the "flexible engagement" idea did not amount to the advocacy of a new security model. Nor was it meant to denote for ASEAN a sudden shift from a state-centric view of security to new security referents or a shift to an exclusive preoccupation with a new category of threats. In the event, the overwhelming majority of ASEAN countries rejected Surin's proposal, mainly because not to do so seemed to potentially open up a can of worms that could endanger intramural stability and, in some cases, jeopardize regime security. Having repulsed "flexible engagement", ASEAN governments nevertheless informally agreed to henceforth allow for "enhanced interaction". (4) This decision reflected the realization of ASEAN decision-makers that they ultimately could not prevent each other from publicly commenting on those intrastate developments that had a perceived detrimental social, economic or political impact on other members or the Association as a whole. Nevertheless, at the time there was (or seemed to be) a subtle but significant difference between "enhanced interaction" and "flexible engagement", insofar as "enhanced interaction" appeared to imply that individual member states could comment on other members' "domestic affairs" although ASEAN should not. In other words, as a compromise, "enhanced interaction" de facto condoned efforts of individual ASEAN leaders to take their colleagues to task on matters heretofore perceived as "domestic affairs" if the issue at hand had cross-boundary implications, while still ruling out the legitimacy of such endeavours being undertaken under ASEAN's auspices. Notably, when put into practice, "enhanced interaction" quickly proved deeply disruptive and divisive within the Association and led to the temporary reassertion of more traditional understandings of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture (Kraft 2000, Ramcharan 2000, Haacke 1999: 598-603). …

"Enhanced Interaction" with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?

Debates over how governments can defeat insurgencies ebb and flow with international events, becoming particularly contentious when the United States encounters problems in its efforts to support a counterinsurgent government. Often the United States confronts these problems as a zero-sum game in which the government and the insurgents compete for popular support and cooperation. The U.S. prescription for success has had two main elements: to support liberalizing, democratizing reforms to reduce popular grievances; and to pursue a military strategy that carefully targets insurgents while avoiding harming civilians. An analysis of contemporaneous documents and interviews with participants in three cases held up as models of the governance approach—Malaya, Dhofar, and El Salvador—shows that counterinsurgency success is the result of a violent process of state building in which elites contest for power, popular interests matter little, and the government benefits from uses of force against civilians.

The "Hearts and Minds" Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare

The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

In April 1999, ASEAN formally admitted Cambodia thereby completing its declared goal of grouping together all ten Southeast Asian countries under its umbrella. This was the culminating event in the latest phase of ASEAN's enlargement. This process, however, had been problematic from the start. The entry of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam without any clear criteria for admission has raised questions regarding the preparedness of these countries to participate in ASEAN. More importantly, it led to strains in ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners over the legitimacy of some of the governments in power in these countries. The was further complicated by the economic upheaval caused by the financial crisis which struck Southeast Asia in 1997. The impact of these events on ASEAN has put into question the association's growing role as a leading player in Asia-Pacific affairs. More importantly, it has raised issues which are central to ASEAN's continued existence.

ASEAN and intra-ASEAN relations: weathering the storm?

(2001). Human Rights, ASEAN and Constructivism: Revisiting the “Asian Values” Discourse. Philippine Political Science Journal: Vol. 22, No. 45, pp. 33-54.

Human Rights, ASEAN and Constructivism: Revisiting the “Asian Values” Discourse

Great Power Dynamics and the Waning of ASEAN Centrality in Regional Security

The inclusion of the three paragraphs in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit that make reference to the obligations of the state and the international community under the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has effectively raised a challenge to the traditional understanding of the principle of sovereignty in international relations. More importantly, their inclusion in the Outcome Document has effectively committed its signatories to RtoP as briefly outlined in the Document. The question, however, is whether or not states will hold themselves to this commitment? Among the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the commitment to RtoP under the Outcome Document is clearly at odds with the oft-emphasized commitment to the principle of non-interference that the members of the Association have long identified with. The establishment of new institutional forms, mechanisms, and blueprints within ASEAN, however, create opportunities for introducing em...

Herman Joseph S. Kraft

Papers

The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

ASEAN and intra-ASEAN relations: weathering the storm?

Human Rights, ASEAN and Constructivism: Revisiting the “Asian Values” Discourse

Great Power Dynamics and the Waning of ASEAN Centrality in Regional Security

RtoP by increments: the AICHR and localizing the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia