Order-preserving encryption allows encrypting data, while still enabling efficient range queries on the encrypted data. This makes its performance and functionality very suitable for data outsourcing in cloud computing scenarios, but the security of order-preserving is still debatable. We present a scheme that achieves a strictly stronger notion of security than any other scheme so far. The basic idea is to randomize the ciphertexts to hide the frequency of plaintexts. Still, the client storage size remains small, in our experiments up to 1/15 of the plaintext size. As a result, one can more securely outsource large data sets, since we can also show that our security increases with larger data sets.

/pdf/frequency-hiding-order-preserving-encryption-1dt5m0gj8e.pdf

Frequency-Hiding Order-Preserving Encryption

The security of order-revealing encryption (ORE) has been unclear since its invention. Dataset characteristics for which ORE is especially insecure have been identified, such as small message spaces and low-entropy distributions. On the other hand, properties like one-wayness on uniformly-distributed datasets have been proved for ORE constructions. This work shows that more plaintext information can be extracted from ORE ciphertexts than was previously thought. We identify two issues: First, we show that when multiple columns of correlated data are encrypted with ORE, attacks can use the encrypted columns together to reveal more information than prior attacks could extract from the columns individually. Second, we apply known attacks, and develop new attacks, to show that the leakage of concrete ORE schemes on non-uniform data leads to more accurate plaintext recovery than is suggested by the security theorems which only dealt with uniform inputs.

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2976749.2978379

What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption?

In recent years, encrypted databases have emerged as a promising direction that provides data confidentiality without sacrificing functionality: queries are executed on encrypted data. However, existing practical proposals rely on a set of weak encryption schemes that have been shown to leak sensitive data. In this paper, we propose Arx, the first practical and functionally rich database system that encrypts the data only with strong encryption schemes. Arx protects the database with the same level of security as regular AESbased encryption, which by itself is devoid of functionality. We show that Arx supports real applications such as ShareLatex and a health data cloud provider, and that its performance overhead is modest.

Arx: A Strongly Encrypted Database System.

We show how to encrypt a relational database in such a way that it can efficiently support a large class of SQL queries. Our construction is based solely on structured encryption (STE) and does not make use of any property-preserving encryption (PPE) schemes such as deterministic and order-preserving encryption. As such, our approach leaks considerably less than PPE-based solutions which have recently been shown to reveal a lot of information in certain settings (Naveed et al., CCS ’15). Our construction is efficient and—under some conditions on the database and queries—can have asymptotically-optimal query complexity. We also show how to extend our solution to be dynamic while maintaining the scheme’s optimal query complexity.

SQL on Structurally-Encrypted Databases

Protected database search systems cryptographically isolate the roles of reading from, writing to, and administering the database. This separation limits unnecessary administrator access and protects data in the case of system breaches. Since protected search was introduced in 2000, the area has grown rapidly; systems are offered by academia, start-ups, and established companies. 
However, there is no best protected search system or set of techniques. Design of such systems is a balancing act between security, functionality, performance, and usability. This challenge is made more difficult by ongoing database specialization, as some users will want the functionality of SQL, NoSQL, or NewSQL databases. This database evolution will continue, and the protected search community should be able to quickly provide functionality consistent with newly invented databases. 
At the same time, the community must accurately and clearly characterize the tradeoffs between different approaches. To address these challenges, we provide the following contributions: 
1) An identification of the important primitive operations across database paradigms. We find there are a small number of base operations that can be used and combined to support a large number of database paradigms. 
2) An evaluation of the current state of protected search systems in implementing these base operations. This evaluation describes the main approaches and tradeoffs for each base operation. Furthermore, it puts protected search in the context of unprotected search, identifying key gaps in functionality. 
3) An analysis of attacks against protected search for different base queries. 
4) A roadmap and tools for transforming a protected search system into a protected database, including an open-source performance evaluation platform and initial user opinions of protected search.

SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search

A data owner outsourcing the database of a multi user application wants to prevent information leaks caused by outside attackers exploiting software vulnerabilities or by curious personnel. Query processing over encrypted data solves this problem for a single user, but provides only limited functionality in the face of access restrictions for multiple users and keys. ENKI is a system for securely executing queries over sensitive, access restricted data on an outsourced database. It introduces an encryption based access control model and techniques for query execution over encrypted, access restricted data on the database with only a few cases requiring computations on the client. A prototype of ENKI supports all queries seen in three real world use cases and executes queries from TPC-C benchmark with a modest overhead compared to the single user mode.

/pdf/enki-access-control-for-encrypted-query-processing-2iq64rsf0p.pdf

ENKI: Access Control for Encrypted Query Processing

Embodiments relate to processing encrypted data, and in particular to identifying an appropriate layer of encryption useful for processing a query. Such identification (also known as the onion selection problem) is achieved utilizing an adjustable onion encryption procedure. Based upon defined requirements of policy configuration, alternative resolution, and conflict resolution, the adjustable onion encryption procedure entails translating a query comprising an expression in a database language (e.g. SQL) into an equivalent query on encrypted data. The onion may be configured in almost arbitrary ways directing the onion selection. An execution function introduces an execution split to allow local (e.g. client-side) query fulfillment that may otherwise not be possible in a secure manner on the server-side. A searchable encryption function may also be employed, and embodiments accommodate aggregation via homomorphic encryption. Embodiments may be implemented as an in-memory column store database system.

Encrypted In-Memory Column-Store

This paper presents an industrial report on the implementation of a system that supports execution of queries over encrypted data. While this idea is not new, e.g. [HILM02, AKRX04, PRZB11], the implementation in a real world large scale in-memory database is still challenging. We will provide an overview of our architecture and detail two use cases to give the reader an insight into how we technically realized the implementation. We then provide three main contributions, reporting that: a) We significantly improve functionality by intelligently splitting query execution, i.e. which parts of a query can be performed in the cloud and which on the client. b) We share some initial performance measurements with the community on basis of the TPCH benchmark. c) We present a domain-specific analysis of three data sets that shows the effects of executing queries over encrypted data and what adjustments are required with respect to the encryption of individual columns. The three made observations on query execution, execution time measurements and domain-specific query analysis will lead us to the conclusion that although searching over outsourced encrypted data is always a trade off between functionality, performance and security, it is realistic to assume that working solutions can be provided in the not too distant future to the market.

/pdf/experiences-and-observations-on-the-industrial-112bstrta0.pdf

Experiences and observations on the industrial implementation of a system to search over outsourced encrypted data.

Embodiments provide ideal security, order-preserving encryption (OPE) of data of average complexity, thereby allowing processing of the encrypted data (e.g. at a database server in response to received queries). Particular embodiments achieve high encryption efficiency by processing plaintext in the order preserved by an existing compression dictionary already available to a database. Encryption is based upon use of a binary search tree of n nodes, to construct an order-preserving encryption scheme having Ω(n) complexity and even O(n), in the average case. A probability of computationally intensive updating (which renders conventional OPE impractical for ideal security) is substantially reduced by leveraging the demonstrated tendency of a height of the binary search tree to be tightly centered around O(log n). An embodiment utilizing such an encryption scheme is described in the context of a column-store, in-memory database architecture comprising n elements. OPE according to embodiments is compatible with adjustable encryption approaches.

Average-complexity ideal-security order-preserving encryption

Methods, systems, and computer-readable storage media for selecting columns for selecting encryption to perform an operator during execution of a database query. Implementations include actions of determining a current encryption type of a column that is to be acted on during execution of the database query, the column storing encrypted data, determining a minimum encryption type for performance of the operator on the column, selecting a selected encryption type based on the current encryption type, the minimum encryption type, and a budget associated with the column, and performing the operator based on the selected encryption type.

Isabelle Hang

Papers

ENKI: Access Control for Encrypted Query Processing

Encrypted In-Memory Column-Store

Experiences and observations on the industrial implementation of a system to search over outsourced encrypted data.

Average-complexity ideal-security order-preserving encryption

Searchable encryption for infrequent queries in adjustable encrypted databases