According to basic economics, if demand exceeds supply, prices will rise, thus decreasing demand or increasing supply until demand and supply are in equilibrium; thus if prices do their job, rationing will not exist. However, credit rationing does exist. This paper demonstrates that even in equilibrium, credit rationing will exist in a loan market. Credit rationing is defined as occurring either (a) among loan applicants who appear identical, and some do and do not receive loans, even though the rejected applicants would pay higher interest rates; or (b) there are groups who, with a given credit supply, cannot obtain loans at any rate, even though with larger credit supply they would. A model is developed to provide the first theoretical justification for true credit rationing. The amount of the loan and the amount of collateral demanded affect the behavior and distribution of borrowers. Consequently, faced with increased credit demand, it may not be profitable to raise interest rates or collateral; instead banks deny loans to borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from those receiving loans. It is not argued that credit rationing always occurs, but that it occurs under plausible assumptions about lender and borrower behavior. In the model, interest rates serve as screening devices for evaluating risk. Interest rates change the behavior (serve as incentive mechanism) for the borrower, increasing the relative attractiveness of riskier projects; banks ration credit, rather than increase rates when there is excess demand. Banks are shown not to increase collateral as a means of allocating credit; although collateral may have incentivizing effects, it may have adverse selection effects. Equity, nonlinear payment schedules, and contingency contracts may be introduced and yet there still may be rationing. The law of supply and demand is thus a result generated by specific assumptions and is model specific; credit rationing does exist. (TNM)

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Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.

Agency theory is an important, yet controversial, theory. This paper reviews agency theory, its contributions to organization theory, and the extant empirical work and develops testable propositions. The conclusions are that agency theory (a) offers unique insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk and (b) is an empirically valid perspective, particularly when coupled with complementary perspectives. The principal recommendation is to incorporate an agency perspective in studies of the many problems having a cooperative structure.

http://strategy.sjsu.edu/www.stable/pdf/Eisenhardt,%20K.%20M.,%201989,%20The%20Academy%20of%20Management%20Review%2014(1)%2057-74.pdf

Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review

25. Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. By D. B. Rubin. ISBN 0 471 08705 X. Wiley, Chichester, 1987. 258 pp. £30.25.

Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys

The use of a fairly standard vehicle width of a little under 2 meters originates from the design of prehistoric carts and sleds as evidenced by rutting in ancient roads which aided in steering Despite dramatic advances in vehicular and infrastructural technologies, the standard has changed little over the millennia The gauges of railroad track, for instance, are now standardized at 4 feet 8 and half inches (1435 mm) across Europe and North America, the same as the first steam railway, and a mere half-inch wider than the typical pre-steam tracks in the mining districts near Newcastle, consistent in size with the wheel gauge used in Roman Britain This standard gauge lasted since it was first used on the Stockton and Darlington railway in 1825, and were adopted by most subsequent lines (Puffert, 2002), despite some railways trying alternatives (eg the Great Western Railway was originally built at 5 feet 6 inches, or 1676 mm) Alternative gauges would have accommodated wider, taller, and faster trains more easily, but the standard gauge that was adopted first acquired advantages as other railways sought compatibility with the standard to obtain access to the uses of earlier lines, and helped lock-in that standard

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2486211.pdf

First‐mover advantages

This paper was presented at the World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985

/pdf/the-theory-of-contracts-226rge376i.pdf

The theory of contracts

In most developing and industrial countries, infrastructure services have traditionally been provided by government enterprises, but in developing countries at least, these enterprises have often proven to be inefficient, unable to provide much-needed investments, and manipulated to achieve political objectives. By contrast, many studies have shown that over the past 30 years, private (or privatized) enterprises in developing countries have, on average, delivered superior performance and needed investments. Explanations differ on why this discrepancy exists. Private enterprises are driven by a desire for profits and may have more professional know-how in management, operating procedures, and use of appropriate technology. But perhaps the most important reason for their stronger performance is that privatization makes intervening in enterprise operations difficult for governments and politicians, so government manipulation is less likely. However, the issue, in general, has been how to ensure that the improved performance and efficiency gains are passed through to the users through lower tariffs and increased coverage, while allowing firms to earn a fair rate of return on their investments.

Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right

https://www.webssa.net/files/guasch_laffont_straub_2008_-_copie.pdf

Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America ☆: Evidence from the water and transport sectors

We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Then we use a data set of nearly 1000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000, covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport and water, to test these predictions. Finally, we derive some policy implications of our theoretical and empirical work.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID340580_code021119570.pdf?abstractid=340580&mirid=2

Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America

This paper analyzes government-led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in Latin America, based on the same sample used in Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) to examine firm-led renegotiations. After extending the theoretical framework to a multiple-period context in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur, we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results. While some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged, significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. We provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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J. Luis Guasch

Papers

Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right

Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America ☆: Evidence from the water and transport sectors

Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America

Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government‐led renegotiation

Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America