Jae-Seung Baek

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors found that change in firm value during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate governance measures, and that firms with higher ownership concentration by unaffiliated foreign investors experienced a smaller reduction in their share value.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine whether equity-linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a Korean chaebol, and they find that companies involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that during the 1997 Korean financial crisis, chaebol firms with higher ownership concentration by unaffiliated investors experienced a smaller reduction in their share value.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods, and they find that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values, but during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experienced a larger rebound in share values.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods, finding that firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experienced a larger rebound in their stock values.