Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis
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In this paper, the authors found that change in firm value during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate governance measures, and that firms with higher ownership concentration by unaffiliated foreign investors experienced a smaller reduction in their share value.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2004-02-01. It has received 650 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Corporate governance & Enterprise value.read more
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Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
TL;DR: The economic entrenchment of large corporations is studied in this article, where the authors posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entropy.
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Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide
TL;DR: In this paper, the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis was investigated using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis.
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Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea
TL;DR: Choi et al. as mentioned in this paper reported strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining the market value of Korean public companies.
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Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
TL;DR: A review of the existing literature on groups can be found in this paper, where the authors point out important biases in the literature including the avoidance of a serious discussion of the origins of business groups, and the unfounded assumption that rentseeking is the only feasible political economy equilibrium in an interaction between groups and the government.
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Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Tarun Khanna,Yishay Yafeh +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a business group taxonomy is proposed, which is used to formulate hypotheses and present evidence about the reasons for the formation, prevalence, and evolution of groups in different environments.
References
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
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Law and Finance
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil law countries located in the middle.
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Legal Determinants of External Finance
TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
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Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem in a corporation with many small owners, where the corporation may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management.