Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

/pdf/international-norm-dynamics-and-political-change-37ig9r9dlq.pdf

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, Social Theory of International Politics develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealist worldview which contrasts with the individualism and materialism which underpins much mainstream international relations theory. He builds a cultural theory of international politics, which takes whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. Wendt characterises these roles as 'cultures of anarchy', described as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. These cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and capabilities, and generate tendencies in the international system. The book describes four factors which can drive structural change from one culture to another - interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint - and examines the effects of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the West.

/pdf/social-theory-of-international-politics-3eegdnnwai.pdf

Social Theory of International Politics

The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory.’ Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?

/pdf/anarchy-is-what-states-make-of-it-the-social-construction-of-39pmlbk9ww.pdf

Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics

Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.

https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Rationalist-Explanations-for-War.pdf

Rationalist explanations for war

A collection of seven essays that serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modelling in the social sciences, and as an overview of the current state of the art in this field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modelling, a technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system.

The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

The Logic of Political Survival

We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets, since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace.

An institutional explanation of the democratic peace

http://www.gbv.de/dms/hebis-mainz/toc/06269491X.pdf

Game Theory for Political Scientists

This paper proposes an alternative logic of alliances to the capability aggregation model where both allies receive security from an alliance. In this alternative logic, one partner receives autonomy benefits, and the other, security benefits from the alliance. The former type of alliances are called symmetric and the latter asymmetric. The paper develops both logics from a model of alliance choices in the face of trade-offs between autonomy and security and provides a precise definition of those two concepts. It then derives a series of critical tests that show the trade-off model is superior to the capability aggregation model. First, asymmetric alliances will be easier to form and last longer than symmetric alliances. Second, regardless of the type of alliance, the greater the change in its members' individual capabilities, the more likely it will be broken. Third, second-rank major powers will be more likely to form asymmetric alliances as their capabilities increase. All the hypotheses are supported by a statistical examination of military alliances formed between 1815 and 1965. The implications of the argument for several topics in international relations theory are drawn out.

Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances

We test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows. The first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests, the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads, and the third that trade flows are greater between allies. We examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990. This period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically. We estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added. Our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad, but alliances generally do not, even when controlling for polarity of the system.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2585487.pdf

James D. Morrow

Papers

The Logic of Political Survival

An institutional explanation of the democratic peace

Game Theory for Political Scientists

Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances

The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907–1990