Previous work shows that average returns on common stocks are related to firm characteristics like size, earnings/price, cash flow/price, book-to-market equity, past sales growth, long-term past return, and short-term past return. Because these patterns in average returns apparently are not explained by the CAPM, they are called anomalies. We find that, except for the continuation of short-term returns, the anomalies largely disappear in a three-factor model. Our results are consistent with rational ICAPM or APT asset pricing, but we also consider irrational pricing and data problems as possible explanations. RESEARCHERS HAVE IDENTIFIED MANY patterns in average stock returns. For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find a reversal in long-term returns; stocks with low long-term past returns tend to have higher future returns. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that short-term returns tend to continue; stocks with higher returns in the previous twelve months tend to have higher future returns. Others show that a firm's average stock return is related to its size (ME, stock price times number of shares), book-to-marketequity (BE/ME, the ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value), earnings/price (E/P), cash flow/price (C/P), and past sales growth. (Banz (1981), Basu (1983), Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985), and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994).) Because these patterns in average stock returns are not explained by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), they are typically called anomalies. This paper argues that many of the CAPM average-return anomalies are related, and they are captured by the three-factor model in Fama and French (FF 1993). The model says that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [E(Ri) - Rf] is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio (RM - Rf); (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio i is,

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05202.x

Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies

https://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/docs/WP/2000/pdf/wpa00041.pdf

Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects $

New tests are presented on the effects of stock illiquidity on stock return. Over time, expected market illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess return (usually called â¬Srisk premiumâ¬?). This complements the positive cross-sectional return-illiquidity relationship. The illiquidity measure here is the average daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume, which is easily obtained from daily stock data for long time series in most stock markets. Illiquidity affects more strongly small firms stocks, suggesting an explanation for the changes â¬Ssmall firm effectâ¬? over time. The impact of market illiquidity on stock excess return suggests the existence of illiquidity premium and helps explain the equity premium puzzle.

Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects

For many years, stock market analysts have argued that value strategies outperform the market. These value strategies call for buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, book assets, or other measures of fundamental value. While there is some agreement that value strategies produce higher returns, the interpretation of why they do so is more controversial. This paper provides evidence that value strategies yield higher returns because these strategies exploit the mistakes of the typical investor and not because these strategies are fundamentally riskier.

Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk

Companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offer ng or a seasoned equity offering, have been poor long-run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5 percent per year for companies going public and only 7 percent per year for companies conducting a seasoned equity offer. Book-to-market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date. IN THIS ARTICLE, WE show that companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO), significantly underperform relative to nonissuing firms for five years after the offering date. The average annual return during the five years after issuing is only 5 percent for firms conducting IPOs, and only 7 percent for firms conducting SEOs. While evidence that firms going public subsequently underperform has been documented previously, our evidence that the same pattern holds for firms conducting SEOs is new. The magnitude of this underperformance is economically important: based upon the realized returns, an investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date. Surprisingly, this number is the same for both IPOs and SEOs. While the difference in returns between issuers and nonissuers on which the 44 percent number is based only holds

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05166.x

The New Issues Puzzle

The value premium in U.S. stock returns is robust. The positive relation between average return and book-to-market equity is as strong for 1929 to 1963 as for the subsequent period studied in previous papers. A three-factor risk model explains the value premium better than the hypothesis that the book-to-market characteristic is compensated irrespective of risk loadings. FIRMS WITH HIGH RATIOS OF BOOK VALUE to the market value of common equity have higher average returns than firms with low book-to-market ratios ~Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein ~1985!!. Because the capital asset pricing model ~CAPM! of Sharpe ~1964! and Lintner ~1965! does not explain this pattern in average returns, it is typically called an anomaly. There are four common explanations for the book-to-market ~BE0ME! anomaly. One says that the positive relation between BE0ME and average return ~the so-called value premium! is a chance result unlikely to be observed out of sample ~Black ~1993!, MacKinlay ~1995!!. Out-of-sample evidence is, however, provided by Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok ~1991!, Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe ~1993!, and Fama and French ~1998!. They document strong relations between average return and BE0ME in markets outside the United States. Using a rather small sample of firms, Davis ~1994! finds that the relation between average return and BE0ME observed in recent U.S. returns extends back to 1941. We extend Davis’ data back to 1926, and we expand the coverage to all NYSE industrial firms. We find that the value premium in pre-1963 returns is close to that observed for the subsequent period in earlier work. These results argue against the sample-specific explanation for the value premium. The second story for the value premium is that it is not an anomaly at all. The higher average returns on high BE0ME stocks are compensation for risk in a multifactor version of Merton’s ~1973! intertemporal capital asset pricing model ~ICAPM! or Ross’s ~1976! arbitrage pricing theory ~APT!. Consistent with this view, Fama and French ~1993! document covariation in returns

/pdf/characteristics-covariances-and-average-returns-1929-to-1997-1uhbw9ra7u.pdf

Characteristics, Covariances, and Average Returns: 1929 to 1997

The value premium in U.S. stocks returns is robust. The positive relation between average return and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) is as strong for 1929-63 as for the subsequent period studied in previous papers. Like others, we also find a size premium in stock returns. Small stocks have higher average returns than big stocks. The size premium is, however, weaker and less reliable than the value premium. The relations between average return and firm characteristics (size and BE/ME) are better explained by a three-factor risk model than by the behavioral hypothesis that investor overreaction causes characteristics to be compensated irrespective of risk loadings.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/98060402.pdf?abstractid=98678&rulid=8311185&mirid=1

Characteristics, Covariances, and Average Returns: 1929-1997

Using a database that is free of survivorship bias, this article finds that book-to-market equity, earnings yield, and cash flow yield have significant explanatory power with respect to the cross-section of realized stock returns during the period from July 1940 through June 1963. There is a strong January seasonal in the explanatory power of these variables, even though small stocks are, by construction, excluded from the sample. Copyright 1994 by American Finance Association.

The Cross-Section of Realized Stock Returns: The Pre-COMPUSTAT Evidence

In this analysis of the relationship between equity mutual fund performance and manager style, two questions are addressed. First, does any investment style generate abnormal returns on average? Second, when funds are grouped by equity style, does any style exhibit performance persistence? The answers from this study are as follows: None of the styles earned positive abnormal returns during the 1965–98 sample period, and value funds realized negative abnormal returns of about 2.75 percentage points a year. Some evidence was found of short-run performance persistence among the best-performing growth funds and among the worst-performing small-cap funds.

James L. Davis

Papers

Characteristics, Covariances, and Average Returns: 1929 to 1997

Characteristics, Covariances, and Average Returns: 1929-1997

The Cross-Section of Realized Stock Returns: The Pre-COMPUSTAT Evidence

Mutual Fund Performance and Manager Style

The cross-section of stock returns and survivorship bias: Evidence from delisted stocks