Jason F. Shogren

TL;DR: Baik et al. as mentioned in this paper extended the Anonymous Dictator game to reveal a setting in which 95 percent of dictators follow game-theoretic predictions, and they argued that just as rewards must be salient, the assets in a bargain must be legitimate to produce rational behavior.

TL;DR: A quantitative bioeconomic modelling framework is presented to analyse risks from non–indigenous species to economic activity and the environment, and it is shown that society could benefit by spending up to US$324 000 year−1 to prevent invasions into a single lake with a power plant.

TL;DR: The economy and the environment: Two Parts of a Whole Technical Note: Game Theory - Market Failure - Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: An Overview - Technical note: Mathematical Programming - Pollution Taxes for the Efficient Control of Pollution -Tradeable Pollution Permits - Transboundary Pollution Problems - An Introduction to Comparative Dynamics and the Economics of Natural Resource Exploitation - Natural Resources: Types, Classification and Scarcity - An Economic Analysis of Nonrenewable Natural Resources - Renewable Resource Economics - The Economics of Forestry Exploisation - Methods

TL;DR: This paper showed that even though the mean WTP and WTA bids for market goods with close substitutes converge after market experience, the endowment effect might still be alive and well, albeit at statisti-cally insignificant levels.

TL;DR: It is argued that an economic solution to the problem of invasive species has two components: one is to use incentives to change human behavior so as to enhance protection against the introduction, establishment, and spread of invasive behavior, and the other is to develop institutions that support the weakest members of global society.