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Jay Sethuraman

Researcher at Columbia University

Publications -  98
Citations -  2559

Jay Sethuraman is an academic researcher from Columbia University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Scheduling (computing) & School choice. The author has an hindex of 27, co-authored 96 publications receiving 2317 citations. Previous affiliations of Jay Sethuraman include Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain

TL;DR: The main contribution is an analogous algorithm for the full preference domain in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects, based on a reinterpretation of the PS mechanism as an iterative algorithm to compute a “flow” in an associated network.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Optimal crawling strategies for web search engines

TL;DR: A two-part scheme, based on network flow theory, that determines the (nearly) optimal crawling frequencies, as well as the theoretically optimal times to crawl each web page, within an extremely general stochastic framework.
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The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and its Applications

TL;DR: It is shown that a related geometry allows us to express any fractional solution in the stable marriage polytope as a convex combination of stable marriage solutions, which leads to a genuinely simple proof of the integrality of the stablemarriage polytopes.
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Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model and derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences.
Proceedings Article

Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications

TL;DR: The optimal cheating strategy is derived and it is shown that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-Optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences.