J
Jean Tirole
Researcher at University of Toulouse
Publications - 444
Citations - 109092
Jean Tirole is an academic researcher from University of Toulouse. The author has contributed to research in topics: Incentive & Market liquidity. The author has an hindex of 134, co-authored 439 publications receiving 103279 citations. Previous affiliations of Jean Tirole include Centre national de la recherche scientifique & École des ponts ParisTech.
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Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
Drew Fudenberg,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors modify the standard principal-agent model with oral hazard by allowing the contract to be renegotiated after the agent's choice of action and before the observation of the action's consequences.
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Merchant Transmission Investment
Paul L. Joskow,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on market driven transmission investment to provide the infrastructure to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity, and showed that relying primarily on a market driven investment framework to govern investment is likely to lead to inefficient investment decisions and undermine the performance of competitive markets.
Posted Content
The Dynamics of Open Source Contributors
TL;DR: In this article, a literature review discusses issues regarding contributions to software, as well as the economic motivations behind open-source contributions, and a panel data set, consisting of approximately 100 open source projects, was compiled from information garnered from SourceForge, press searches, and project websites.
Journal ArticleDOI
Compléter l'euro
Patrick Artus,Agnès Bénassy-Quéré,Laurence Boone,Jacques Cailloux,Jacques Delpla,Emmanuel Farhi,Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas,Jean Tirole,Guntram B. Wolff +8 more
Quantity competition with large fixed costs
Eric Maskin,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a class of alternating-move infinite-horizon models of duopoly and derive dynamic programming equations for an MPE with short-run commitments, where the timing is meant to capture the presence of short run commitments.