This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

A Survey of Corporate Governance

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor

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Wireless Communications

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

A Course in Game Theory

Does finance affect economic growth? A number of studies have identified a positive correlation between the level of development of a country's financial sector and the rate of growth of its per capita income. As has been noted elsewhere, the observed correlation does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. This paper examines whether financial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that financial development reduces the costs of external finance to firms. Specifically, we ask whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets. We find this to be true in a large sample of countries over the 1980s. We show this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality.

/pdf/financial-dependence-and-growth-2meheeba1z.pdf

Financial Dependence and Growth

This paper reviews our understanding of the growing open source movement. We highlight how many aspects of open source software appear initially puzzling to an economist. As we have acknowledge, our ability to answer confidently many of the issues raised here questions is likely to increase as the open source movement itself grows and evolves. At the same time, it is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, despite the presence of claims to the contrary. The labor and industrial organization literatures provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, the role of contributors, and the movement's ongoing evolution can be viewed.

The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond

L'article procede a une revue de la litterature theorique sur la recherche-developpe­ment. Il aborde deux themes principaux : valeur privee et valeur sociale d'une inno­vation brevetee, competition pour l'innovation. ; Les incitations privees a l'innovation sont d'abord examinees en fonction de la formule adoptee pour l'exploitation d'une invention (brevet unique, licence de brevet) et de la structure du marche pre et post innovation (concurrence, monopole, oligopole). ; La seconde partie concentre l'attention sur les modeles ou la competition pour l'innovation est assimilee a une course et ou le phenomene de preemption joue un role determinant.

L'économie de la recherche-développement : introduction à certains travaux théoriques

We study the role of Standard Setting Organization (SSOs) in the adoption of standards. The way the SSO balances the interests of sponsor and users is key to its ability to certify the technology. Proximity to users builds trust in the endorsement, but may be unattractive to technology sponsors. In a static context, we show that the SSO is an effective certifier if and only if it puts enough weight on users' interests. We then tackle the more challenging problem of SSO certification in a dynamic setting in which new information will accrue in the future and user choices are irreversible. The SSO and the users must then both take a dynamic perspective and contemplate the possibility of a “second chance” that may arise for the standard. A key insight is the possibility of multiple self-fulfilling expectations. It is possible to have an equilibrium with no second chance, a lenient SSO endorsement policy and high stigma from early rejection. It is also possible to have an equilibrium with a second chance, a selective SSO endorsement policy and low stigma from early rejection. Finally, and in both the static and the dynamic setups, we ask whether the SSO is too inclined to turn down or to accept the standard from a social viewpoint. (JEL: D71, D82, L15, O31)

Certifying new technologies

https://www.cairn-int.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=E_NCAE_003_0001&download=1

Completing the Euro

What is the best way to reward innovation? While prizes avoid deadweight loss, intellectual property selects high social surplus projects. Optimal innovation policy thus trades off the ex-ante screening benefit and the ex-post distortion. It solves a multidimensional screening problem in the private information held by the innovator: research cost, quality and market size of the innovation. The appropriate degree of market power is never full monopoly pricing and is determined by measurable market characteristics, the inequality and elasticity of innovation supply, making the analysis open to empirical calibration. The framework has applications beyond IP policy to the optimal pricing of platforms or the optimal procurement of public infrastructure.

/pdf/market-power-screens-willingness-to-pay-2thdrny2cq.pdf

Jean Tirole

Papers

The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond

L'économie de la recherche-développement : introduction à certains travaux théoriques

Certifying new technologies

Completing the Euro

Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay